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This paper provides estimates of federal tax rates by income groups in the United States since 1960,
with special emphasis on very top income groups. We include individual and corporate income
taxes, payroll taxes, and estate and gift taxes. The progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system at the
top of the income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s. This dramatic drop in
progressivity is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with
a sharp change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor
income. The sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only
moderately to the decline in tax progressivity. International comparisons confirm that is it critical
to take into account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent of overall
tax progressivity, both for time trends and for cross-country comparisons. The pattern for the United
Kingdom is similar to the US pattern. France had less progressive taxes than the US or UK in 1970
but has experienced an increase in tax progressivity and has now a more progressive tax system than














Over the last 40 years, the U.S. federal tax system has undergone three 
striking changes, each of which seems to move the federal tax system in the 
direction of less progressivity. First, there has been a dramatic decline in top 
marginal individual income tax rates. In the early 1960s, the statutory individual 
income tax rate applied to the marginal dollar of the highest incomes was 91 
percent. This marginal tax rate on the highest incomes declined to 28 percent by 
1988, increased significantly to 39.6 percent in 1993, and fell to 35 percent as of 
2003. Second, corporate income taxes as a fraction of gross domestic product 
have fallen by half, from around 3.5-4.0 percent of GDP in the early 1960s to  
less than 2 percent of GDP in the early 2000s (for example, Auerbach, 2006). 
However, corporate profits as a share of GDP have not declined during this 
period, suggesting that capital owners – who are disproportionately of above-
average incomes -- get to earn relatively more net of taxes today than in the 
1960s. Third, there has been a substantial increase in payroll tax rates financing 
Social Security retirement benefits and Medicare. The combined employee-
employer payroll tax rate on labor income has increased from 6 percent in the 
early 1960s to over 15 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the Social 
Security payroll tax applies only up to a cap--equal to $90,000 of annual earnings 
in 2005--and is therefore a relatively smaller tax burden as incomes rise above 
the cap.  
However, the conclusion that these three changes have reduced the 
progressivity of the federal tax system less obvious than it may at first appear.  
For example, in the case of the individual income tax, the numerous deductions 
and exemptions mean that the tax rates listed in the tax tables might be a poor 
measure of the actual tax burden faced by each income group. In addition, some 
forms of income, such as capital gains, have traditionally faced lower tax rates, 
which benefits disproportionately high income taxpayers. In the case of the 
corporate income tax, there are competing theories about who bears the burden 
of the tax: for example, does it reduce returns for stockholders, or reduce the 
returns on other assets such as bonds or pensions of future retirees, or is it paid   2
by workers in the form or lower wages, or is it paid by consumers in the form of 
higher prices?  
We begin this paper by using the large public micro-file tax return data to 
estimate the current progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system, which 
essentially includes individual and corporate income taxes, estate taxes, and 
payroll taxes. We will lay out what we think are the most plausible and simple 
assumptions about the incidence of taxes based on previous work.  We will then 
look at trends in the progressivity of the U.S. tax system from 1960 to the 
present. Throughout this discussion, we will pay particular attention to small 
groups at the top of the income distribution, who often represent a significant 
fraction of aggregate income and aggregate taxes paid, and who often face tax 
rules that have their main impact at the top of the income distribution. 
Government agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) produce annual statistics on tax 
progressivity in the United States. Our approach differs from the IRS statistics 
(Parisi, 2004-05; Strudler et al., 2005), because those IRS statistics ignore other 
federal taxes such as the corporate income tax, the estate tax, or payroll taxes. 
Our approach differs from the CBO statistics (CBO, 2001) because we focus 
primarily on top incomes while they focus primarily on income quintiles.
1 Our 
approach also differes from classic comprehensive studies of tax progressivity 
like Pechman and Okun (1974), Pechman (1985), or Kasten et al. (1994), 
because our more basic method does not incorporate state and local taxes, and 
we ignore government transfers. However, we provide progressivity results for 
over 40 years, while previous studies have focused on a few years at most. We 
will then contrast the U.S. results with the experience from other countries. Using 
a similar (if simplified) methodology, we will present progressivity results for the 
tax systems of France and the United Kingdom.  
 
   3
Current Federal Tax Progressivity in the United States 
 
The definition of a progressive tax system usually starts with the idea of a 
proportional tax, in which everyone pays the same share of income in taxes. 
From that baseline, a progressive tax is when the share of income paid in taxes 
rises with income, and a regressive tax is when the share of income paid in taxes 
falls with income. Of course, real-world tax codes are complex and full of rules 
that have different effects across the income distribution. Thus, a more general 
definition is that a tax system can be defined as progressive if after-tax income is 
more equally distributed than before-tax income, and regressive if after-tax 
income is less equally distributed than before-tax income.   
Inequality and tax progressivity have many facets and should be explored 
along different measures depending on the specific issue one wants to examine.  
For example, an analyst can look at the impact of taxes on the poverty rate or on 
a measure of inequality like the Gini coefficient. In this paper, we will focus on top 
income shares, defined as how the tax code affects the fraction of total income 
going to a given group in the income distribution, such as the top decile or top 
percentile.
2  
  We begin with estimates of the progressivity of the U.S. tax code in 2004. 
More precisely, we use data on incomes for the year 2000, which is the most 
recent year for which detailed micro data on types of income is available. We 
adjust for nominal and real growth to 2004 dollars, and then apply the tax code 
as it stood in 2004.  
 
  Income Groups 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 The department of Treasury and the Joint Committee on Taxation also produce distributional 
analyses to evaluate tax reforms. Their distributional analyses are close to those of CBO (see 
CBO, 2001). 
2 The after-tax income share is equal to before-tax income share times the ratio of one minus the 
tax rate for the given group to one minus the average tax rate across the full distribution. Or in 
algebraic terms: after-tax income share = before tax income share * (1-average tax rate for the 
group)/(1- average tax rate economy wide). 
   4
  The first column of Table 1 displays the groups we are considering 
according to the percentile of income, ranging from the second quintile 
(Percentile 20-40) to the top 0.01 percent (P99.99-100). We exclude the bottom 
quintile (P0-20) from the analysis because many low income earners have zero 
market income and receive only government transfers such as Social Security or 
Disability income, and do not file income tax returns. Groups are based on “tax 
units”. A tax unit is defined in the U.S. tax code as a married couple or a single 
person, with their dependents if they have any. The total number of tax units in 
2004 is 144 million and is taken from Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006). It is 
estimated from census data as the sum of all adults (aged 18 and above in the 
U.S. population) less all married women. In other words, this is the total number 
of tax units in the United States if every family had been required to file an 
individual tax return. In recent decades, about 90 to 95 percent of tax units file a 
tax return. Non-filers have in general very low incomes and they owe little or no 
income tax.  
  The average income for each group of tax units is shown in column 2. 
Income is defined as all sources of market income reported on income tax 
returns. This includes wages and salaries (before employer and employee Social 
Security and Medicare payroll taxes are deducted), bonuses and exercised 
stock-options, employer and private pensions, self-employment income, business 
income, dividends, interest, and rents, as well as realized capital gains.
3 We also 
exclude all government transfers such as Social Security retirement and disability 
benefits, government-provided health benefits (Medicare and Medicaid), 
unemployment and workers compensation, and all cash and in-kind welfare 
                                                 
3 Because realized capital gains are not an annual regular stream of income and tend to 
be realized by individuals in a lumpy way once every few years, we rank tax units based on 
income excluding realized capital gains when we define the income fractiles. We then add back 
realized capital gains to the incomes of each of those income groups (Piketty and Saez, 2003 use 
the same definition for one set of their top income share series). Ranking individuals based on 
income including capital gains would make the individual income tax look less progressive as 
capital gains have generally received a favorable treatment.  
   5
programs. Our admittedly simple approach sidesteps a number of issues about 
how to measure income appropriately: for example, our income measure does 
not include the value of imputed rent for homeowners and does not exclude 
interest payments on debts such as mortgages or consumer credit. Our income 
measure also excludes non-taxable benefits such as employer provided health 
care. At the end of this section, we offer some further discussion of conceptual 
issues that can arise in measuring income. We use the large publicly available 
micro dataset of individual tax returns produced by IRS, available most years 
from 1960 to 2001 to estimate individual income and construct our various 
income fractiles. Full details on our estimation methodology, as well as a 
comparison with estimates from previous contributions, are reported in appendix. 
 
  
   Taxes, Tax Rates, and Tax Incidence  
We consider four federal taxes: the individual income tax, the corporate 
income tax, the estate (and gift) tax, and the payroll tax financing disability, 
retirement, and health benefits for the elderly. Those four federal taxes represent 
over 90 percent of all federal taxes. The remaining federal taxes are primarily 
excise taxes like those on gasoline, alcohol and tobacco and various other small 
taxes such as stamp duties.  
The federal individual income tax is the largest tax, typically collecting 7-
10 percent of GDP in most years since the 1960s. Individual income taxes 
declined sharply from 2000 to 2004 following the tax cuts of the Bush 
administration, falling from 10.3 percent of GDP in 2000 to 7.0 percent of GDP in 
2004. The payroll tax financing Social Security and Medicare has increased 
significantly, climbing from about 2 percent of GDP in the 1960s to 6.4 percent of 
GDP by 2004. The corporate income tax has shrunk dramatically: it was typically 
3.5-4.0 percent of GDP in the 1960s, but had fallen to 1.6 percent of GDP by 
2004. The estate and gift tax has always been very small relative to the other 
taxes, although it is important for distributional analysis because it   6
disproportionately affects those with higher incomes. The estate tax collected 
about 0.6 percent of GDP in the 1960s, and 0.25 percent of GDP in 2004.  
  Columns 3 to 6 display the average (not the marginal) tax rate for each of 
the four federal taxes we are considering; that is, what share of income for that 
group was collected by that tax in 2004. Column (7) displays the sum of the 
average tax rate of all four taxes combined.  
  We use the TAXSIM calculator developed at the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (Coutts and Feenberg, 1993) to compute federal individual 
income taxes.  
  Payroll taxes are by definition paid based on wages and salaries and 
shared between employers and employees. This distinction is in principle 
irrelevant. We assume that both the employer and employee payroll tax is paid 
by the wage earner, so that for most employees in recent years, the federal 
payroll tax rate is 15.3% (and not 7.65%). 
  We will assume that the corporate income tax falls entirely on capital 
income and that all financial assets (and not only corporate stock) bear the tax 
equally. Auerbach (2006) summarizes the literature on the incidence of the 
corporate income tax and points out that there is still considerable uncertainty on 
the question because of the inherent difficulty in measuring empirically the 
economy-wide incidence of the corporate tax. Our assumption that the corporate 
income tax falls on capital income in general can be seen as a middle-ground 
assumption between two scenarios. In one scenario, the corporate income tax 
falls solely on shareholders. Because corporate stock ownership is more 
concentrated than wealth ownership in general, the corporate income tax would 
look more progressive under this scenario. In the other scenario, the corporate 
tax is shifted on to labor income, either in the form of reduced wages or 
increased commodity prices. Because capital income is more concentrated than 
labor income, the corporate income tax would look less progressive under this 
scenario.
4  
                                                 
4 The increased openness of the US economy might have shifted the corporate tax more toward 
labor income, which would accentuate the trends we document here.   7
  The federal estate tax is paid based on total net worth of the decedents 
after various exemptions such as spousal bequests and charitable donations. 
Only net estates larger than $1.5 million in 2004 are liable for the estate tax. As a 
result, only about 1 percent of all adult decedents are liable for the estate tax in 
2004. We use IRS published tabulations reporting the number of estates and 
estate taxes paid by size of estate to estimate the amount of taxes paid by each 
fractile of decedents (relative to the total number of adult deaths). We then 
assume that those taxes are borne by the corresponding fractile of tax units. This 
basic method is valid to the extent that ranking by income is relatively close to 
ranking by wealth at the top of the distribution. 
 
  How Taxes Affect the Income Distribution 
Column 8 of Table 1 displays the share of pre-tax income for each group. 
Column 9 displays the share of post-tax income for each group. These statistics 
illustrate several themes. First, the federal tax system as a whole was 
progressive in 2004. The post-tax share of income is higher than the pre-tax 
share of income for those income groups that are lower in the income 
distribution; conversely, the post-tax share of income is lower than the pre-tax 
share of income for the groups highest in the income distribution, above the 90
th 
percentile. Second, the statistics show that, even though the very top groups are 
very small in terms of number of families, they represent a large share of income 
earned, and an even larger share of total taxes paid. For example, the upper half 
of 1 percent of the income distribution earned 15.6 percent of total, and paid 22.5 
percent of all federal taxes.  
 
  Some Caveats  
The calculations presented in Table 1 sidestep or ignore a number of 
issues. We mention seven of those issues here.  
First, government transfers, such as welfare programs, accrue 
disproportionately to the bottom of the income distribution and also reduce 
inequality in disposable income. Conceptually, transfers should be included (as a   8
negative) in the tax rates to estimate the full redistribution carried out by the 
government through taxes and transfers. However, as our focus in this paper will 
primarily be on the top of the income distribution, and since transfers represent a 
very small fraction of middle and high-income earners incomes, ignoring 
transfers has little impact on our results.  
Second and related, there is an argument that the payroll taxes that 
finance Social Security benefits should not be treated as a pure tax because 
Social Security benefits depend on payroll taxes paid. In principle, one would 
want to subtract the value of future Social Security benefits from payroll taxes 
paid on an individual basis and consider only the pure tax component of the tax. 
For simplicity, we count the entire payroll tax financing Social Security as a tax.
5  
Social Security benefits are overall progressive (the progressive benefits formula 
more than compensates for the lower life expectancy of lower income groups, 
Liebman, 2002). Hence, taking into account Social Security benefits would make 
the Social Security payroll tax look less regressive but would not affect much top 
income groups. 
Third, we focus on annual incomes, which are not a perfect measure of 
permanent income over the course of a lifetime. Several studies have shown 
that, because of year-to-year transitory fluctuations in income, progressive 
individual income taxes appear less progressive from a lifetime perspective than 
from an annual perspective (for example, Fullerton and Rogers, 1993). However, 
there is also substantial evidence that consumption tracks income closely, either 
because households face borrowing constraints or because they do not plan 
according to the classic inter-temporal utility model (Akerlof, 2005). Thus, the 
best measure of economic affluence is probably in between the extreme cases of 
the annual perspective and the lifetime perspective. Measuring lifetime income 
requires longitudinal data, but there are no publicly available longitudinal data 
                                                 
5 Medicare benefits are independent of payroll tax contributions, and hence the Medicare payroll 
tax is a pure tax.   9
that do a good job of the very top of the U.S. income distribution. In this paper, 
we focus solely on the annual perspective.
6  
Fourth, our analysis ignores behavioral responses to taxation such as tax 
avoidance, reduction in labor supply or savings due to taxation. Those behavioral 
responses create an excess burden on taxpayers over and above the taxes paid; 
Fullerton and Rogers (1993) build a general equilibrium model where they 
estimate total tax burdens, including excess burdens. However, economists have 
substantial disagreement on the size of behavioral responses to taxation, and so 
considering the basic case with no behavioral response is a useful starting place.  
Fifth, we ignore untaxed income, which is especially important in the case 
of in-kind employer benefits such as health care insurance and the imputed rent 
of homeowners.
7 Health benefits and pensions accrue disproportionately (relative 
to income) to the middle and upper middle class and would reduce estimated 
average tax rates for those groups. However, this would probably not affect much 
the time series analysis for top groups. 
Sixth, a number of issues arise in thinking about the treatment of capital 
gains. In our approach, capital gains serve as a way of counting corporate 
income. After all, retained earnings are reflected in the stock prices and will be 
part of our income definition when capital gains are realized on those stocks. In 
the long-run and in the aggregate, realized capital gains on corporate stock 
reported on individual tax returns are of comparable magnitude to retained 
earnings from corporations estimated in national accounts. Realized capital gains 
(or equivalently retained earnings) are net of corporate income taxes. Because 
we include corporate income taxes in the analysis, we need to add back 
corporate income taxes to income (see e.g., Feldstein, 1988). There are also 
issues regarding what portion of capital gains should be counted as income, and 
when it should be counted. In principle, capital gains should be counted as 
                                                 
6 Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2006) show that mobility has been quite stable within top wage 
income groups since the 1950s suggesting taking a longer term perspective for measuring 
income would probably not bias the trend of declining progressivity that we document here. 
7 Similarly, our income measure excludes contributions to employer pensions (either defined 
benefits or defined contribution pensions), but we do include employer pensions when they are   10
income when they accrue rather than when they are realized. However, our 
income measure includes only realized capital mainly because unrealized gains 
are difficult to observe.
8 Also, there is an argument in principle for adjusting 
capital income for inflation and only counting real gains as income, both in the 
case of capital gains and in the case of interest income (Feldstein, 1988).  We do 
not attempt such a correction here. 
Finally, we ignore state and local taxes in this study. Federal taxes 
represent about two-thirds of all U.S. taxes, the remaining third are state and 
local taxes. State and local taxes in the United States are primarily of three types. 
First, state income taxes (individual and corporate) tend to be progressive and 
are about 25 percent of state and local tax revenues on average.
9 Second, 
property income taxes, primarily on residential real estate, are about 30 percent 
of state and local tax revenue. Property taxes are progressive if incidence falls 
primarily on property owners, but become regressive if they are shifted on rents. 
Third, sales and excise taxes, which are regressive as lower income families 
spend a larger fraction of their income on taxed consumption goods, are about 
35 percent of state revenue. Overall, state and local taxes are believed to be 
somewhat regressive but this depends on the assumed incidence of the property 
tax. If the property tax is assumed to fall on owners of capital, then overall, 
Pechman (1985) shows that state and local taxes are very close to being 
proportional to income across income groups. In that case, ignoring state and 
local states would be of no consequence when assessing overall tax 
progressivity.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
received. Thus, our pension income measure, like our measure of capital gains, can be viewed as 
based on realization rather than accrual 
8 Capital gains are never realized on individual tax returns if the assets are transferred at death or 
through inter-vivos gifts. Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) estimate that, in 1998, such capital 
gains on transferred assets represent about 35 percent of the value of gross estates reported on 
estate tax returns. The fraction of never realized gains passed at death for financial assets are 
small relative to realized capital gains reported on individual tax returns and are ignored in this 
study.  
9 State income taxes can be deducted as an itemized deduction from income for federal income 
tax purposes. As we do not include state taxes in our analysis, we have also not deducted state 
taxes in our individual income tax TAXSIM computations.     11
U.S Trends in Federal Tax Progressivity 
 
  To examine the evolution of U.S. federal tax progressivity over time, it is 
necessary to look at the patterns of how the tax code has evolved over time and 
how sources and size of income – especially for the very top of the income 
distribution – have evolved over time.  
 
  Federal Tax Rates Over Time 
  Figure 3 displays the average federal tax rate paid in 1960 and 2004 for 
various groups along the income distribution. Again, as in Table 1, because the 
latest IRS micro data is only available until year 2001 (before most of the recent 
tax cuts took place), we report tax rates based on 2004 tax law, applied to 
incomes reported in 2000 and adjusted for nominal and real growth.  
  The federal tax system is clearly progressive. In 2004, the average tax 
rate increases smoothly with income from less than 10 percent in the second 
quintile (P20-40) to around 35 percent at the very top. In that year, the average 
tax rate increases only modestly from 30 percent in the bottom half of the top 
percentile (P99-99.5) to 35 percent at the very top (P99.99-100), suggesting that 
the current federal tax system is relatively close to a flat tax rate within the top 1 
percent (incomes above around $300,000 in 2004).  
The figure also shows how the total federal tax rate is decomposed into 
individual income tax, payroll tax, corporate income tax, and estate tax average 
rates. The individual income tax is the main component driving progressivity in 
2004. The average individual tax rate is actually negative at the bottom of the 
income distribution (primarily because of the refundable Earned Income tax 
Credit) and increases to an average rate of over 25 percent at the very top. The 
progressivity of the federal income tax is due to the increasing structure of 
marginal tax rates coupled with exemptions and credits, which benefit lower 
incomes disproportionately. The average tax rate, however, remains substantially 
below the top marginal tax rate of 35 percent even at the very top, because of 
lower tax rates on long-term capital gains and dividends (a 15 percent maximum   12
rate) and, to a lesser extent, deductions for mortgage interest payments and 
charitable contributions.  
The corporate income tax and the estate tax are also progressive in 2004: 
– they increase from a combined average rate of less than 2 percent at the 
bottom of the income distribution to about 7 percent at the very top – but are 
small relative to the individual income tax. Those two taxes are progressive 
because capital income is concentrated at the top of the income distribution. The 
estate tax also has a very progressive structure coupled with very large 
exemptions, so that less than 1 percent of adults who die are liable to pay any 
estate tax. Finally, the payroll tax is regressive, involving an average tax rate of 
about 11 percent of total income below the top decile and declining to about 1 
percent at the very top. This is due to the cap in the Social Security payroll tax 
(above $87,900 in 2004) and the fact that labor income is a smaller fraction of 
total income at the top than in the middle of the distribution.    
  The contrast between the progressivity of federal taxes in 2004 and in 
1960 is striking, as shown in Panel B in Figure 3.  In 1960 federal tax system 
imposed higher average tax rates on those with low incomes, then lower rates on 
a middle group up to the 95
th percentile, and much higher rates within the top 5 
percent of the income distribution, especially in very top groups. The lower tax 
burden in 1960 for the middle groups is largely due to the fact that the payroll tax, 
which falls primarily on the groups from P20 to P95, was much smaller in 1960 
than today. The 1960 federal tax system was very progressive even within the 
top percentile with an average tax rate of around 35 percent in the bottom half of 
the top percentile to over 70 percent in the top 0.01 percent.  This finding 
illustrates the theme that it is important to decompose the top of the income 
distribution into very small groups in order to capture the progressivity of a tax 
system. Although very top groups contain few taxpayers, they account for a 
substantial share of income earned, and an even larger share of taxes paid. 
Interestingly, the larger progressivity in 1960 is not mainly due to the 
individual income tax. The average individual income tax rate in 1960 reached an 
average rate of 31 percent at the very top, only slightly above the 25 percent    13
average rate at the very top in 2004. Within the 1960 version of the individual 
income tax, lower rates on realized capital gains, as well as deductions for 
interest payments and charitable contributions, reduced dramatically what 
otherwise looked like an extremely progressive tax schedule, with a top marginal 
tax rate on individual income of 91 percent. 
  The greater progressivity of federal taxes in 1960, in contrast to 2004, 
stems from the corporate income tax and the estate tax. The corporate tax 
collected about 6.5 percent of total personal income in 1960 and only around 2.5 
percent of total income today. Because capital income is very concentrated, it 
generated a substantial burden on top income groups. The estate tax has also 
decreased from 0.8 percent of total personal income in 1960 to about 0.35 
percent of total income today. As a result, the burden of the estate tax relative to 
income has declined very sharply since 1960 in the top income groups. 
  Table 2 displays the pattern of federal average tax rates for different 
income groups in 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and the projection for 2004. The table 
shows a flattening of the tax rate structure. In 1960, average taxes collected were 
fairly flat up from the 20
th the 90
th percentile, and then rose sharply. By 1980, 
average taxes collected from the very top income groups, especially within the 
top percentile, had declined sharply, while average tax rates collected from 
between the 40
th and 95th percentiles had risen. From 1980 to 1990, tax rates at 
the top declined, while tax rates in the middle class stayed constant. In the 
1990s, tax rates increased only within the top 5 percent. The 2004 projected tax 
rates restore lower rates of 1990 at the top and reduce tax rates on the middle 
class below the levels of 1980, 1990, or 2000. 
 
  Income and Taxes At the Top of the Income Distribution 
The changes in progressivity of the income distribution since 1960 have 
been most marked at the very top of the income distribution, which as Table 1 
illustrated, accounts for a substantial share of total income. Piketty and Saez 
(2003) document the evolution of the incomes of those at the very top of the   14
income distribution.  Figure 2 displays the total share of income received by the 
top 0.1 percent of the income distribution and its composition.  
Two important facts stand out. First, the share of income going to the top 
0.1 percent of the income distribution has grown tremendously since the late 
1970s: the share of total income received by the top 0.1 percent was around 2.5 
of total income in the 1970s and reached a peak above 9 percent of total income 
2000. In fact, most of the overall increase in the inequality of income has been 
driven by the very top of the income distribution. The U.S. Bureau of the Census 
reports, using a somewhat different definition of income than ours, that the top 
quintile of the income distribution received 43-44 percent of all income in the 
1970s, but this share had increased to about 50 percent by 2001. Piketty and 
Saez (2003) show that most of the relative income gains for the top quintile have 
been concentrated within the top 1 percent -- and especially the top 0.1 percent -
- with relatively modest gains in the top decile excluding the top percentile (P90-
95 and P95-99).  
Second, the composition of top incomes has changed substantially. Figure 
2 shows the breakdown into wage income, business income, capital income, 
realized capital gains, and imputed corporate taxes. In the 1960s, top incomes 
were primarily composed of capital income: mostly dividends and capital gains. 
The surge in top incomes since the 1970s has been driven in large part by a 
steep increase in the labor income component, due in large part to the explosion 
of executive compensation. As a result, labor income now represents a 
substantial fraction of income at the top.  This change in composition is important 
to keep in mind, because the corporate and estate taxes that had such a strong 
effect on creating progressivity in the 1960s would have relatively little effect on 
labor income.  
  Figure 3 shows how the progressivity of the federal income tax system 
has mitigated income concentration since 1960. Panel A displays the share of 
total income received by the top 0.1 percent of the distribution before and after all 
federal taxes. Panel A shows that the federal tax system reduced income 
concentration the most in the 1960s and 1970s when income concentration was   15
relatively low, and that the federal tax system has a relatively modest effect on 
the top 0.1 percent income share in recent years when income inequality has 
become higher. To put it another way, the pre-tax share of income for the top 0.1 
percent rose from 2.6 percent in 1970 to 9.3 percent in 2000. The rise in after-tax 
income shares was from 1.2 percent in 1970 to over 7.3 percent in 2000.  In 
percentage point terms, the increase in pre-tax incomes is slightly greater than 
the increase in post-tax incomes.  But in terms of observing what those with very 
high incomes can afford to consume, the after-tax share of income for those in 
this income group multiplied by a factor of 6.1, while the pre-tax share of income 
multiplied by a factor of 3.5. The tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003 have 
further weakened the redistributive power of the federal income tax today.
10  
  When the pattern of redistribution is broken down into different taxes, an 
expected pattern emerges. The overall extent of redistribution from the very top 
of the income distribution was higher in the 1960s, mainly because of the impact 
of the corporate income tax and the estate tax. In more recent years, as the 
relative magnitude of the corporate and estate taxes has diminished and as 
average income tax rates have dropped a great deal at the bottom of the income 
distribution, the income tax has become the primary element of progressivity – 
that is, creating a gap between pre-tax and post-tax income for those at the 
highest income levels -- in the overall federal tax code. 
  Panel B of Figure 3 displays the average tax rate of the top 0.1% (on the 
left axis) and shows that most of the decline was concentrated in a relatively brief 
period from 1976 to 1988 when the average rate dropped from over 60% to 35%. 
The share of taxes paid by various income groups is sometimes used as a 
measure of progressivity, but this measure is improper and misleading. Panel B 
                                                 
10  It is a disputed question whether the surge in reported top incomes has been caused 
by the reduction in taxation at the top through behavioral responses. There is clear evidence of 
short-term responses to changes in tax rates through retiming of income realization or shifts from 
the corporate to the individual tax base. Demonstrating a long-term causal relationship from top 
tax rates to more economic activity at the top, and especially the surge in top wage compensation 
is almost impossible (Saez, 2004).  It is conceivable that causality might have run in reverse way 
and that non-tax forces generated an increase in income concentration and that top income 
earners were able to use their greater incomes to influence the political process and obtain a 
reduction in tax progressivity subsequently. 
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also shows the fraction of total taxes paid by the top 0.1% income group (on the 
right axis). The share of taxes paid is given by 
 
Top 0.1% share of tax = Top 0.1% tax rate * Top 0.1% income share/ Average 
tax rate.  
 
Panel A shows that the share of income received by the top 0.1 percent has risen 
dramatically over several decades, and it is not surprising the see that indeed the 
share of tax series follows the income share series. But although the share of tax 
paid by the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution has increased substantially 
over the last 30 years, the average tax rate of the top 0.1% has declined 
substantially over that same time. When the share of income received by the top 
income groups is changing, the share of tax paid by those top income groups is a 




In this section, we apply the same methodology to France and the United 
Kingdom, and we compare the resulting patterns of effective tax rates for 1970 
and a recent year with those obtained for the United States.
11 The top half of 
displays the average tax rates in all three countries across income groups for 
1970; the bottom half of the table shows the results for a recent year: 2005 in 
France, 2004 in the United States, and 2000 in the United Kingdom. The table 
also shows how those tax rates are broken down into individual income taxes, 
payroll taxes, and estate and wealth taxes. We did not include the corporate tax 
in the French and British analysis because it would have required a much more 
in depth analysis. However, in contrast to the United States, the ratio of corporate 
                                                 
11 The estimates presented for France and the U.K. rely on a number of simplifying assumptions 
which are presented in the technical appendices to the working paper version Piketty and Saez 
2006). In particular, we exclude the large value added taxes and excise taxes from our French 
and U.K. estimates which are slightly regressive. Those taxes constitute about one third of tax 
revenue in those countries. As France and the U.K. have very small local taxes, this indirect tax   17
taxes to has been fairly stable in France and the United Kingdom since 1960, 
suggesting that including the corporate tax would not alter the direction of change 
in tax progressivity in those countries. The British results build upon the top 
income share series and individual tax rate series built by Atkinson (2006) and 
the French results build upon Piketty (2003). 
Three key findings emerge from our international perspective. First, in all 
three countries, individual income tax progressivity has declined substantially 
since 1970. The decline has been particularly sharp in the United Kingdom, 
where the average share of income collected by income tax for fractile P99.95-
100 dropped from over 69 percent to less than 35 percent in 2005. In contrast to 
the United States, the very high British top marginal rates prevailing in 1970 were 
not tempered by tax deductions and tax loopholes.  
In recent years, individual income tax burdens incurred by top income 
groups are virtually identical in all three countries today, with average tax rates 
around 30 percent at the very top. In particular, contrarily to popularly-held 
beliefs, effective individual income tax rates currently incurred by top income 
groups are smaller in France than in Anglo-Saxon countries. At fractile P99-99.5, 
the average income tax rate was only 11.6 percent in France as of 2005, as 
compared to 21.4 percent in the United States and 27.4 percent in the United 
Kingdom. That is, most high-wage individuals currently pay a substantially higher 
share of their income in the form of individual income taxes in the United States 
or in the United Kingdom than in France. The statutory top marginal rate is 
currently 48 percent in France, versus 35 percent in the United States and 40 
percent in the United Kingdom.
12 But the higher top marginal tax rates in France 
are largely undone by the large base exemptions and tax deductions that have 
always characterized the French individual income tax system. Also, the share of 
French taxpayers facing these very high marginal rates is relatively low. The last 
columns of the recent data show that the share of income received by the top 0.5 
                                                                                                                                                 
exclusion is thus comparable to excluding the local and state taxes in the U.S. case, which are 
also seen as slightly regressive.    18
or 0.1 percent of the income distribution in France is much smaller than in the 
United States or the United Kingdom.  
  In 1970, the progressivity of the tax code taken as a whole was 
unambiguously smaller in France than in the United Kingdom or the United 
States. For example, the top .01 percent of the distribution paid 75 percent of 
income in taxes in the United States in 1970 over 90 percent of income in taxes 
in the United Kingdom, but only 48.8 percent of this group’s total income went to 
taxes in France.  During most of the post-war period, income tax progressivity 
has been substantially larger in Anglo-Saxon countries than in France and most 
other continental European countries. For example, Dell (2006) presents an 
analysis of Germany, which appears fairly close to France.  
This pattern illustrates a general point made by Lindert (2004): countries in 
which government spending is a fairly high share of GDP have always relied on a 
mix of taxes that create relatively low distortion, with less progressivity, large 
exemptions for capital income, and so on. Meanwhile, Anglo-Saxon countries in 
which government spending is a relatively low share of GDP have historically 
relied on more progressive taxes. According to Lindert, this pattern is the key 
reason why the huge rise of social transfers in high government-spending 
countries such as France did not generate large efficiency losses and hence 
reductions in aggregate growth. Although Lindert’s point holds true if one adopts 
a long-run perspective, the novelty from the recent decades is that Anglo-Saxon 
countries have gone through a series of significant top rate cuts since the 1970s, 
and have converged (and overshot) towards the average of the OECD countries 
in terms of the progressivity of their overall tax code.  
A second major finding from Table 2 is that the payroll tax burden has 
increased substantially over the 1970-2005 period in all three countries. The rise 
in payroll tax burden has been particularly large in France. As of 2005, the 
employee payroll tax is 22.5 percent of gross wages in France, and the employer 
payroll tax is 42.5 percent. In practice, this means that the total labor cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Estimates for France were computed using 2005 tax law, and did not take into account the new 
income tax cuts recently announced by the French government (the top marginal rate is   19
corresponding to a net wage of 77.5 is as large as 142.5 (and the income tax 
then applies to the remaining 77.5). In France in 1970, the employee and 
employer payroll tax rates were respectively 8.2 percent and 32.8 percent of 
gross wages. Moreover, most payroll taxes were capped in 1970, and most have 
been gradually uncapped between 1970 and 2005 and now apply to all wages, 
including very top wages. 
 As all internationally-mobile high-wage earners should know, the reason 
why the overall tax burden is on average much higher in France than in Anglo-
Saxon countries has little to do with the individual income tax, and a lot to do with 
the many social contributions levied through payroll taxation. However, because 
very top incomes are disproportionately composed of business and capital 
income rather than wage income (and especially so in France), the overall impact 
of payroll taxation on tax progressivity is regressive. In France, as of 2005, the 
regressivity of the payroll tax system undoes the progressivity of the individual 
income tax system, so that the resulting tax system is basically flat. The last two 
columns of Table 2 for France in 2005 show that the pre-tax and post-tax shares 
of income in France are almost the same. For instance, the combined income 
and payroll average tax rate is 36.6 percent at the level of fractile P0-90 (1.8 
percent income tax, 34.8 percent payroll tax), and 37.3 percent at the level of 
fractile P99.99-100 (28.8 percent income tax, 8.5 percent payroll tax).  Of course, 
the overall picture of how government affects the distribution of income would 
look substantially different if we were to look at the benefits side, which are not 
taken into account in this paper, and not only at the tax side.   
The third key conclusion emerging from our international perspective is 
that in spite of the parallel evolutions of income and payroll tax components, 
overall tax progressivity has not evolved in the same way in all three countries 
during the 1970-2005 period. Figure 6 illustrates this by displaying the (full) 
average tax rates across income groups in the three countries in 1970 (Panel A) 
and more recently (Panel B). In this case, however, we show the bottom 90 
percent of the income distribution grouped together, while separating out the 
                                                                                                                                                 
scheduled to drop to around 42 percent in 2007).    20
percentiles above which make such a substantial difference to productivity. 
Progressivity of the overall tax code has unambiguously declined in the United 
States and in the United Kingdom. The average share of income paid by those at 
the very top of the income distribution has dropped substantially. However, 
progressivity in the overall French tax code did not change much from 1970 to 
2005, and may even have increased somewhat, especially at the very top end of 
the distribution. This is due to a combination of two factors: the estate tax and the 
wealth tax. First, while the impact of the estate tax on progressivity has declined 
enormously in the United States and in the United Kingdom, it has increased in 
France. The progressivity of estate taxation has always been fairly moderate in 
France, just as in a number of continental European countries such as Germany, 
especially for estates transmitted to spouses and children (so-called “direct line” 
estates). The top marginal estate tax rate was only 20 percent in France until 
1983, when it was raised to 40 percent. In contrast, the top marginal estate tax 
rate in the United States and in the United Kingdom was above 70 percent during 
most of the post-World War II period, and was gradually reduced since the 
1980s. As a consequence, the contribution of estate taxation to overall tax 
progressivity has declined substantially in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom between 1970 and 2005, while it has increased somewhat in France. 
The other important factor is the creation of a wealth tax in France 
following the 1981 election, which brought a socialist party to power. France then 
repealed the wealth tax in 1986 and re-introduced it in 1989. It is now levied on 
the top 1 percent wealth holders, with a top marginal rate of 1.8 percent on 
wealth above 15 millions euros (or approximately $20 million U.S. dollars). As 
one can see from Table 2, the contribution of the wealth tax to overall tax 
progressivity is sizeable. The wealth tax pushes the effective average taxes 
above 60 percent in France in 2005. This level of average taxation for groups at 
the very top of the income scale in France in 2005 is still far less than the levels 
observed in 1970 in the United States and in the United Kingdom for the very top 
groups. Thus, the French socialist governments of the 1980s-1990s are   21
supporters of progressive taxation, but less so than the Democrat and Labor 
Anglo-Saxon governments of the 1950s-1960s.    
Although these comparative results for the United States, France and the 
United Kingdom results rely on incomplete and exploratory estimates, we believe 
they illustrate several points. First, to assess progressivity of an overall tax 
system, it is critical to take a broad view of the tax system. Without taking estate 
and wealth taxation into account, it would not be apparent that tax progressivity 
has increased somewhat in a country like France between 1970 and 2005, while 
it has declined enormously in the United Kingdom and in the United States. 
Second, these findings suggest show that Lindert’s (2004) law is either about to 
change or has already done so. That is, Anglo-Saxon countries with relatively low 
levels of government spending relative to GDP used to have a more progressive 
tax system than high-spending welfare states. However, today, a high-spending 
welfare state like France seems to display both higher average tax rates and 
higher tax progressivity. This interesting issue deserves further research. In 
particular, one would need to look at a much broader set of countries, especially 
from the viewpoint of intra-European tax competition, and to develop more 




  This paper has discussed the progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system, 
its evolution since 1960, and how it compares with other countries. Several   
important findings emerge. 
First, the progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system at the top of the 
income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s. For example, the 
top 0.01 percent of earners paid over 70 percent of their income in federal taxes 
in 1960, while they paid only about 35 percent of their income in 2005. Average 
federal tax rates for the middle class have remained roughly constant over time. 
This dramatic drop in progressivity at the upper end of the income distribution is 
due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and to a lesser extent estate and gift   22
taxes which fall on capital income combined with a sharp change in the 
composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor income. 
The reduction in top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only 
marginally to the decline of progressivity of the federal tax system, because with 
various deductions and exemptions, along with favored treatment for capital 
gains, the average tax rate paid by those with very high income levels has 
changed much less over time than the top marginal rates. These large reductions 
in tax progressivity since the 1960s took place primarily during two periods: the 
Reagan presidency in the 1980s and the Bush administration in the early 2000s. 
The only significant increase in tax progressivity since 1960 took place in the 
early 1990s during the first Clinton administration.  
Second, the most dramatic changes in the federal tax system progressivity 
almost always take place within the top 1 percent of income earners, with 
relatively small changes occurring below the top percentile. For example, many 
of the recent tax provisions that are currently hotly debated in Congress, such as 
whether there should be a permanent reduction in tax rates for capital gains and 
dividends, or whether the estate tax should be repealed, affect primarily the top 
percentile of the distribution – or even just an upper slice of the top percentile. 
This pattern strongly suggests that, in contrast to the standard political economy 
model, the progressivity of the current tax system is not being shaped by the self-
interest of the median voter.
13 
Third, international comparisons confirm that is it critical to take into 
account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent 
of overall tax progressivity, both for time trends and for cross-country 
comparisons. We hope that the preliminary international comparisons presented 
in this paper will contribute to stimulate more systematic comparative research in 
this area. 
                                                 
13 Permanent reductions in dividend and capital gains combined with a repeal in the estate tax 
would certainly reduce the current progressivity of federal taxes and favor large wealth holders. 
The Alternative Mininum Tax, which is not indexed for inflation and hits more and more tax filers, 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Population $52,110 11.5 9.3 2.3 0.4 23.4 100.0 100.0
(144 million families)
P20-40 $15,897 -3.2 10.6 2.0 0.0 9.4 6.1 7.2
P40-60 $29,870 3.2 11.2 1.7 0.0 16.1 11.5 12.6
P60-80 $52,137 7.3 11.6 1.6 0.0 20.5 20.0 20.8
P80-90 $83,012 9.2 11.9 1.6 0.0 22.7 15.9 16.1
P90-95 $117,709 11.6 11.5 1.8 0.0 24.9 11.3 11.1
P95-99 $199,033 16.4 8.1 2.5 0.1 27.2 15.3 14.5
P99-99.5 $428,690 21.4 4.6 3.7 1.6 31.3 4.1 3.7
P99.5-99.9 $863,607 23.8 3.0 4.3 1.9 33.0 6.6 5.8
P99.9-99.99 $3,158,720 25.1 1.6 4.9 2.4 34.1 5.5 4.7
P99.99-100 $18,113,612 26.2 1.4 4.6 2.5 34.7 3.5 3.0
Notes: Computations are based on income tax return statistics and NBER TAXSIM calculator. 
They are based on incomes from 2000 adjusted for growth and using 2004 tax law.
Families are ranked based on market income excluding realized capital gains and imputed payroll and corporate taxes.
P20-40 denotes families between percentile 20th and percentile 40th of the income distribution (second quintile), etc.
Average income includes realized capital gains and imputed payroll and corporate taxes. Tax rates are estimated
relative to income including realized capital gains and imputed payroll and corporate taxes.
Payroll tax includes employee+employer Social Security and Medicare taxes (excludes payroll taxes for unemployment 
and workers compensation)
Average tax rates (percent) Income shares
Table 1. Income and Federal Tax Rate Statistics in 2004 (based on 2000 inflated incomes)Income Groups 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Population 21.4 23.3 26.6 25.8 27.4 23.4
P20-40 13.9 18.5 16.3 16.2 13.1 9.4
P40-60 15.9 20.2 21.4 21.0 20.0 16.1
P60-80 16.7 20.7 24.5 24.3 23.9 20.5
P80-90 17.4 20.5 26.7 26.2 26.4 22.7
P90-95 18.7 21.4 27.9 27.9 28.7 24.9
P95-99 23.5 25.6 31.0 28.6 31.1 27.2
P99-99.5 34.0 36.1 37.6 31.5 35.7 31.3
P99.5-99.9 41.4 44.6 43.0 33.0 38.4 33.0
P99.9-99.99 55.3 59.1 51.0 34.3 40.2 34.1
P99.99-100 71.4 74.6 59.3 35.4 40.8 34.7
The Table displays the average federal tax rate (including individual, corporate, payroll, and estate) 
for various groups of the income distribution, for various years.
2004 figures are based on 2004 tax law applied to 2000 incomes adjusted for economic growth.
Average federal tax rates (percent)











































Full Population 12.5 5.8 0.7 4.3 23.3 100.00 100.00 11.5 9.3 0.4 2.3 23.4 100.00 100.00
P0-90 9.9 7.2 0.0 3.2 20.2 67.61 70.54 5.4 11.5 0.0 1.5 18.5 53.75 57.28
P90-95 13.7 4.5 0.0 3.2 21.4 10.76 11.03 11.6 11.5 0.0 1.8 24.9 11.29 11.07
P95-99 16.1 3.0 0.7 5.7 25.6 12.60 12.23 16.4 8.1 0.1 2.5 27.2 15.28 14.51
P99-99.5 20.7 1.5 3.8 10.0 36.1 2.87 2.39 21.4 4.6 1.6 3.7 31.3 4.11 3.69
P99.5-99.9 25.8 0.9 5.8 12.0 44.6 3.63 2.62 23.8 3.0 1.9 4.3 33.0 6.63 5.80
P99.9-99.99 31.5 0.4 12.5 14.7 59.1 1.76 0.94 25.1 1.6 2.4 4.9 34.1 5.46 4.69
P99.99-100 32.2 0.1 23.4 19.0 74.6 0.76 0.25 26.2 1.4 2.5 4.6 34.7 3.48 2.96
B. France
Full Population 5.3 20.8 0.3 26.4 100.00 100.00 3.8 33.3 0.7 37.8 100.00 100.00
P0-90 2.3 24.0 0.0 26.3 69.30 69.39 1.8 34.8 0.1 36.7 68.93 70.19
P90-95 6.4 17.6 0.2 24.2 10.65 10.97 4.5 33.7 0.6 38.8 11.57 11.39
P95-99 10.6 14.1 0.4 25.1 12.51 12.74 7.0 31.4 1.4 39.8 12.84 12.44
P99-99.5 16.8 10.6 0.8 28.2 2.59 2.52 11.6 26.5 2.2 40.3 2.36 2.27
P99.5-99.9 21.9 7.4 1.9 31.2 3.09 2.88 16.4 21.4 5.1 43.0 2.67 2.45
P99.9-99.99 30.2 4.2 4.2 38.6 1.37 1.14 22.3 16.5 8.9 47.8 1.19 1.00
P99.99-100 40.1 1.7 6.9 48.8 0.50 0.35 28.8 8.5 24.2 61.5 0.43 0.26
C. United Kingdom
Full Population 17.1 7.0 1.1 25.1 100.00 100.00 15.0 8.3 0.3 23.7 100.00 100.00
P0-90 13.0 8.1 0.0 21.2 71.64 75.42 9.7 7.6 0.0 17.3 61.22 66.34
P90-95 19.0 5.8 0.2 25.0 10.10 10.12 15.8 13.8 0.0 29.6 11.72 10.81
P95-99 25.0 4.1 2.1 31.2 11.41 10.49 21.7 11.9 1.0 34.6 14.79 12.66
P99-99.5 32.3 2.4 5.5 40.3 2.40 1.91 27.4 10.1 1.3 38.8 3.45 2.76
P99.5-99.9 41.3 1.6 10.4 53.4 2.86 1.78 30.5 8.6 1.3 40.5 4.81 3.76
P99.9-99.95 52.3 1.0 16.5 69.8 0.57 0.23 33.2 7.6 1.4 42.2 1.30 0.98
P99.95-100 69.2 0.6 21.9 91.7 1.01 0.11 34.5 6.5 1.5 42.5 3.42 2.58
Notes: Computations based on income tax return statistics. United Kingdom computations based on Atkinson (2006). 
See Piketty and Saez (2006) for complete details on methodology.
Note that top group in the United Kingdom is P99.95-100 (and not P99.99-100 as in the US or France)
US numbers are based on 2004 tax law applied to 2000 incomes (adjusted to economic growth).
France numbers are based on 2005 tax law applied to 1998 incomes (adjusted to economic growth).
UK numbers are based on 2000 tax law applied to 2000 incomes (adjusted to economic growth).
UK and French computations exclude the corporate income tax.
2004 (US), 2005 (France), 2000 (UK)
Average tax rates (percent) Shares (percent)
Table 3. International and Historical Comparison of Tax Rates
Average tax rates (percent) Shares (percent)
1970 (US, France, and UK)FIGURE 1
Federal Tax Rates in the United States in 2004 and 1960
Figures display the tax rate for each of the 4 federal taxes for various groups of the income distribution
in 2004 (based on 2000 incomes adjusted for economic growth) and in 1960.





















































































Individual Tax Payroll Tax
Corporate Tax Estate Tax





















































































Individual Tax Payroll Tax
Corporate Tax Estate TaxFIGURE 2
The Top 0.1% Income Share and Composition, 1960-2001
The figure displays the income share of the top 0.1% tax units, and how the top 0.1% incomes are  
divided into four income components: wages and salaries (including exercised stock options), 
business income (S-corporation profits, partnership profits, sole proprietorship profits), capital income (di
interest and rents), realized capital gains. Imputed corporate taxes are included in the corresponding cat
































































































Wage Income Business Income
Capital Income Capital GainsFIGURE 3
Top 0.1% income shares before and after tax, average tax rate, and share of taxes paid
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After all federal taxes









































































































































share tax paidFIGURE 4
Tax Rates in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 1970 and today
Figure displays tax rates across income groups in the three countries.
Note that tax rates in the US include the 4 federal income taxes.
Tax rates in France and the United Kingdom include individual income taxes, payroll taxes, and estate and wealth taxes
but exclude corporate income taxes.
In the United Kingdom, the two top groups are P99.9-99.95 and P99.95-100 (instead of P99.9-99.99 and P99.99-100)













































































































































United StatesAppendix A: Sources and Methodology for Income and Tax Rates Statistics for 
the United States 1960-2004 
 
A.1 Data and Methodology 
 
We use the publicly available individual tax return micro data constructed by the IRS. 
The data are repeated cross sections available quasi-annually from 1960 to 2001.
1 
The data oversample high income tax returns and allow a very detailed analysis of 
the top of the income distribution. 
 
First, we rank tax returns based on a measure of gross income, which includes the 
sum of all market income components reported on tax returns but excluding realized 
capital gains. Those components include wages and salaries, employer and private 
pensions, small business income (sole proprietorships, partnerships, subchapter S 
corporations), taxable interest income, dividends, net rents, and other smaller items 
such as royalties or fiduciary income reported on tax returns. Our measure of income 
is consistent over the years and is essentially defined as Adjusted Gross Income 
(AGI) for tax purposes less realized capital gains included in AGI, less government 
transfers included in AGI such as Unemployment Insurance or Social Security 
Benefits, plus all the small adjustments which are made to gross income obtain AGI 
(such as moving expenses, self-employment taxes, etc.). 
 
Second, we define groups such as quintiles, top decile, top percentile, etc. based on 
all tax units in the United States had everybody been required to file a tax return. This 
total number of tax units is taken from Piketty and Saez (2003) and was estimated 
from census data as the sum of all single adults (aged 20 and above) plus all married 
couples. From 1960 to 2001, about 90% of tax units did file a tax return. We assume 
that non-filing tax units earn 20% of the average income of filing units. Non-filers tend 
to be retirees with social security transfer income and very small market incomes. 
 
Third, we compute income earned by each group as the market income used for 
ranking tax units plus realized capital gains reported on tax returns plus the employer 
                                            
1 All years except 1961, 1963, and 1965 are available. part of federal payroll taxes (which is not included in wages and salaries reported on 
tax returns) plus imputed corporate taxes (see below for the imputation method). The 
shares of income accruing to each group are obtained by dividing the income of the 
group by total income from all groups (assuming again that non-filing units earn 20% 
of the average income of filing units).  
 
Fourth, we compute taxes at the individual level in the micro-data as follows: 
 
Individual federal income tax is computed using the TAXSIM calculator developed at 
the NBER. When doing those calculations, we do not deduct state income tax 
liabilities for federal tax purposes. As a result, our federal tax liability is slightly larger 
than the actual federal tax liability but gives a more accurate picture of federal tax 
progressivity as we are ignoring state taxes in this analysis. 
 
Payroll taxes are computed based on the simple rate formulas. We include both the 
employee and the employer component of federal payroll taxes, which finance the 
Social Security and Disability benefits as well as Medicare benefits. For example, in 
2004, those taxes are equal to 15.3 percent of wages and salaries up to the $90,000 
cap and 2.9% of wages and salaries above the $90,000 cap. The tax return data do 
not provide the breakdown of wages salaries at the individual level but payroll taxes 
are based on individual wages and salaries. As a result, we assume that wages and 
salaries for married tax filers are taxed up to 120% of the individual cap.  
 
Corporate taxes are assumed to fall on all capital income earned by financial assets 
in the U.S. economy.
2 We first compute total capital income earned by individuals as 
the sum of all capital income reported on tax returns (defined as realized capital 
gains, interest, dividends, rents and royalties, fiduciary income, and two thirds of 
profits from small businesses) and capital income earned by pension and insurance 
funds. The amount of capital income earned by pension and insurance funds is 
computed so that the ratio of capital income from those funds to capital income 
reported on individual returns is the same as the ratio of pension and insurance fund 
assets to other financial assets held by individuals (from the flow of funds accounts). 
                                            
2 We do not assume that corporate taxes fall on returns to real estate assets because we ignore 
imputed rents of home owners in this study.    We then compute an effective corporate tax rate defined as federal corporate 
tax liabilities (accruing in the current calendar year and reported in the National 
Income Accounts) divided by total capital income estimated as above.  
  This corporate rate is applied to capital income reported on tax returns 
(defined as above). This corporate rate is also applied to estimated capital income 
form pension and insurance funds. We then assume that this part of the corporate tax 
falls proportionately on wages and salaries and pensions (as the vast majority of 
returns from pension funds accrues to current employees and retired employees). 
 
Total federal estate and gift taxes are taken from National Income Accounts. We 
assume that estate and gift taxes fall on decedents. We assume that the top 1% 
decedents are in the top 1% income group, etc. We define the top 1% decedents as 
one percent of all adult decedents (aged 20 and above) in the United States. Then, 
using the distribution tables produced by the IRS for estate tax, we estimate the 
fraction of estate taxes paid by the top 1% decedents. We then assume that the top 
1% income earners bear the same fraction of all estate and gifts taxes estimated in 
the National Income Accounts.  
 
Once the four federal taxes are computed for each group, we divide taxes paid by 
income earned for each group to obtain the corresponding tax rates. The total federal 
tax rate is the sum of all four taxes. 
 
Table A0 displays the total number of tax units, the number of tax returns actually 
filed, and the nominal average income per tax unit. 
 
Tables A1 and A2 display the pre-tax and post-tax (respectively) income shares for 
the various income groups we consider. 
 
Table A3 reports the tax rates for each of the four taxes we consider (individual, 
payroll, corporate, and estate) as we as the total tax rate for all the income groups we 
consider. 
 
A.2 Comparison with US government agencies estimates 
 Government agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) produce annual statistics on tax progressivity in 
the United States. Our approach differs from the IRS statistics (Parisi, 2004-05; 
Strudler et al., 2005), because those IRS statistics ignore other federal taxes such as 
the corporate income tax, the estate tax, or payroll taxes.  
 
CBO (2001) has also produced federal tax estimates by income groups for the period 
1979-2001 (updated to 2004). The department of Treasury and the Joint Committee 
on Taxation also produce distributional analyses to evaluate tax reforms. Their 
distributional analyses are close to those of CBO (see CBO, 2001). Those two 
agencies do not produce systematic annual estimations as the CBO does but rather 
produce distributional calculations for any tax reform that is proposed by the Treasury 
department or Congress. As a result, we will focus on the comparison with CBO 
estimates. CBO estimates differ from the current estimates for a number of reasons 
(see Chapter 2 in CBO (2001) for a detailed methodological description). By order of 
importance: 
 
  First, CBO focuses primarily on quintiles and breaks down the top quintile in 
the top decile, and top percentile but does not study smaller groups within the top 
percentile. Hence while our analysis is primarily focused on progressivity within the 
top decile and especially the top percentile, CBO focuses more on overall 
progressivity. 
  Second and related, CBO does not include estate taxes in its estimates which 
is not very important below the top percentile but would substantially change our 
findings within top groups. In contrast to our study, CBO does include federal excise 
taxes (mostly taxes on tobacco, alcohol and gasoline) which are relatively small and 
negligible at the top. 
Third, CBO estimates are based on a more comprehensive definition of 
income that the one we use. CBO definition also includes the imputed cash value of 
employer provided benefits (such as health insurance), voluntary retirement 
contributions (such as 401(k)s),
3 and all transfer programs from the government 
                                            
3 CBO (2001) acknowledges that counting both workers contributions to retirement plans and pension 
withdrawals of retirees is double counting. Therefore, it seems more rational to us to count only 
income when the tax is due (typically at retirement for most US retirement programs). (cash welfare but also in-kind programs such as Medicaid, and Medicare, food 
stamps). Our view is that an AGI based measure of income is much more familiar to 
readers than a more comprehensive measure including in-kind employer benefits. 
More importantly, we believe that government transfers should be conceptually 
considered as part of the tax and transfer system as they are two tools that the 
government uses simultaneously for redistribution. Hence we think that it is 
preferable to ignore transfers entirely (and focus on top groups where they are not 
important) as we do here rather than count them in income and offer a partial and 
somewhat arbitrary view of government redistribution as the CBO does.  
Furthermore, in the CBO study, income groups are determined based on full 
income  including realized gains. This latter assumption reduces significantly 
individual income tax rates at the top in the period 1979-1986 when realized capital 
gains were treated very favourably (only 40% of gains were included in taxable 
income). As discussed in the main text, realized capital gains are a very volatile and 
lumpy source of income so that we believe that it is more meaningful to rank tax units 
based on income excluding realized capital gains and then add back those gains to 
our income measures.
4 This is an especially important issue for top groups. 
  Fourth, CBO focuses on households instead of tax units. A household is 
defined as the set of individuals living together and may contain several tax units (for 
example, two single adult sisters living together). There are about 144 million tax 
units in the United States in 2004 (had everybody been required to file a tax returns) 
but there are only about 110 million households. In order to rank household into 
income groups, CBO adjusts household income by the number of individuals in the 
household by dividing household income by the square root of the number of 
individuals. For example, a family of four earning $100,000 will be assigned income 
$50,000=100,000/sqrt(4) in the ranking. Income groups such as quintiles are chosen 
to contain the same number of individuals (but not of households). Those complex 
adjustments are made to try and measure better real disposable income at the 
individual level. However, they come at a cost in complexity: groups are no longer 
transparently defined groups by thresholds based on a familiar AGI type measure of 
income.  
                                            
4 CBO is aware of this issue and mentions that the ideal solution is to make a life-time based analysis 
of income and taxes. We agree with CBO but still believe that our ranking excluding capital gains is an 
acceptable short-cut which parsimoniously removes the largest issue with fluctuating incomes.   Finally, CBO imputes corporate taxes only on reported capital income while we 
impute corporate taxes on all capital income either reported as capital income on tax 
returns or accruing to non-taxable pension funds (which we impute on wage income). 
Because of the large development of pension funds since 1980, corporate taxes fall 
relatively more on labor income today than in previous decades. This factor 
contributes to reducing the progressivity of corporate taxes. 
 
  Figure A3 and A4 report the average tax rates for the top 1% from our 
estimates and from CBO respectively. Those series overlap for years 1979 to 2001. 
The broad patterns are comparable. We see that the CBO estimates are slightly 
lower because of their more comprehensive income definition. CBO also finds a 
lower decline in individual tax rates in the 1980s primarily because they include 
realized capital gains in the ranking of tax units. As a result, their tax rates are 
relatively higher in the pre-1987 period when capital gains received a very favourable 
treatment (only 40% of such gains were included in taxable income).  
   
Appendix B : Sources and Methodology for Income and Tax Rates Statistics for 
France and the United Kingdom 1970 and today 
 
Table A4 reports various aggregate income and tax statistics for the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France in 1970 and today (2004 for the US, 2000 for the 
UK, and 2005 for France). Panel A reports aggregate statistics: total personal 
income, total number of tax units, average real pre and post tax income per tax unit, 
as well as average tax rate for each of the taxes we consider. Panel B reports 
average tax rates from OECD (2005) for all taxes. Those rates are computed as the 
ratio of the nominal amounts reported in OECD (2005) divided by the total income 
used in this study (reported in Panel A). US tax rates reported by OECD include not 
only federal but also state and local taxes, explaining the discrepancy. The main 
discrepancies between the French and UK tax rates used in the study and the OECD 
rates are explained below. 
 
B.1 France 
 Income levels: net-of-payroll-tax income levels for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,..,P99.99-
100 are borrowed from Piketty (2001, Appendix B).
5 These were computed using 
published tax tabulations annualy available since 1914 and large tax returns micro 
files available since 1988. Income levels for 2005 were obtained by updating 1998 
estimates (the latest year covered in Piketty (2001)), using 1998-2002 published tax 
tabulations and average household income growth rates for 2002-2005. In the same 
way as for the U.S., tax units were ranked based on income excluding realized 
capital gains, and realized capital gains were then added back to the average income 
of each fractile and incorporated into the capital income component.
6 Finally, 
employer and employee payroll tax (both are deductible from income subject to the 
income tax in France) were added to the average income of each fractile and 
incorportated into the wage income component, using the methodology described 
below. 
 
Individual Income tax rates: income tax rates for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,..,P99.99-
100 are borrowed from Piketty (2001, Appendix B). These were computed using 
published tax tabulations annually available since 1914 and large tax returns micro 
files available since 1988. Income levels for 2005 were obtained by updating 1998 
estimates (the latest year covered in Piketty (2001)), using 1998-2005 changes in the 
income tax schedule (current tax schedules are available on www.impots.gouv.fr). 
Tax on the capital gains component (a flat tax of 15%) was incorporated in the 
effective income tax rate of each fractile. 
 
Payroll tax rates: payroll tax rates for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,...,P99,99-100 were 
computed using the detailed 1950-2005 payroll tax schedules published by INSEE.
7 
Payroll tax schedules are fairly complex in France, and we made the following 
simplifying assumptions. In France gross wages w are subject to a total employee 
payroll tax rate t1 and to a total employer payroll tax rate t2. Total labor cost is equal 
to  (1+ t2)w, and net-of-payroll-tax wage is equal to (1- t1)w (this is the wage income 
subject to the income tax). Therefore one needs to multiply income-tax wage income 
by (1+ t2)/(1- t1) in order to compute imputed payroll tax. This is roughly what we did 
                                            
5 A much shortened, English-language version of Piketty (2001) was published in Piketty (2003). 
6 We used both for 1970 and 2005  the average percentages in additional income corresponding to 
capital gains reported in Piketty (2001, Appendix B) for years 1988-1995 (percentages rank from 0.4% 
for fractile P0-90 to 5.0% for fractile P99-99.5 and 21.0% for fractile P99.99-100). 
7 See INSEE Résultats n°735, « Séries longues sur les salaires édition 200x » (various years). for each fractile P0-90, P90-95,..,P99.99-100 for years 1970 and 2005, using data on 
income composition by fractile (wage income share, capital income share, business 
income share) borrowed from Piketty (2001, Appendix B). In 2005, we used t1=22.5% 
and  t2=42.5%. In 1970, we used t1=8.2% and  t2=32.8%. For both years and for both 
employee and employer payroll tax, the pure-tax component of payroll taxes (i.e. 
those designed to pay for lump-sum benefits such as health insurance, worker 
training programmes, etc., and means-tested benefits such as family benefits) and 
the contributions-related component of payroll taxes (i.e. those designed to pay for 
pensions and unemployment insurance benefits).
8  Most contributions-related 
benefits are roughly proportional to contributions (and hence to wages), with 
numerous exceptions and complications due to intergenerational redistribution 
effects, so that according to standard estimates around 50% of contributions-related 
payroll taxes can be viewed as a pure tax. For simplicity, in this study, we consider 
that entire payroll tax financing benefits in France as a pure tax. An additional 
complication comes from the fact that some payroll taxes are levied up to a wage 
ceiling and some are levied on all wages. The key parameter is the so-called   
“plafond de la Sécurité sociale” P. The level of P is adjusted every year and is 
currently equal to about 29,000 € (gross annual wage), i.e. about twice the minimum 
wage. In 2005, out of the 22.5% total employee payroll tax rate, 5.0% was levied on 
wages up to 4P,  8.8% on wages up to 8P, and 8.7% on all wages (no ceiling). Out of 
the 42.5% total employer payroll tax rate, 7.5% was levied up to 4P, and 35% on all 
wages. In 1970, out of the 8.2% total employee payroll tax rate, 5.6% was levied on 
wages up to 1P,  1.6% on wages up to 4P, and 1% on all wages (no ceiling). Out of 
the 32.8% total employer payroll tax rate, 19.3% was levied up to 1P, 9.9% on wages 
up to 4P, and 3.6% on all wages. We applied to those rules to average wage income 
for each fractile P0-90, P90-95,..,P99.99-100 (assuming all tax units in each fractile 
receive the same average wage income). Note that although most benefits are non-
taxable in France (and are therefore excluded from the income concept used for our 
computations), most pensions are taxable (with the exception of minimum pensions) 
and are incorporated in the wage income category of tax statistics. Pure wage 
income (excluding pension income) made up about 80% of total wage income in 
                                            
8 For simplicity and for the sake of comparability, we include CSG (Contribution Sociale Generalisee) 
in employee payroll tax in 2005. CSG is the proportional income tax on all incomes (not only wage 
income) which gradually replaced health-insurance employee payroll tax (and partly family-benefits 
employee payroll tax) since 1991. 2005 and 90% in 1970, so we applied payroll taxes to 80% and 90% of wage income 
(respectively). Finally, note that payroll tax rates applied to public-sector wages are 
significantly smaller than the rates applied to private-sector wages, especially 
because there is virtually no formal employer payroll tax in the public sector (in 
particular, public sector pensions are unfunded and are paid out of the general 
budget). However, income-tax-based income statistics do not offer any public/private 
wage decomposition, so we chose to apply private-sector payroll tax rates to all wage 
incomes. This largely explains why our estimated aggregate payroll tax rates (33.3% 
of total income in 2005, 20.8% in 1970) are somewhat larger than actual payroll 
income tax receipts (our estimates are about 5% larger than tax receipts for 1970, 
and about 15% larger in 2005). In a sense, our larger estimates are closer to the true 
economic payroll tax rates (unfunded public-sector benefits are paid for by general 
taxes such as the VAT). In 2005, our slight overestimate of payroll tax receipts is 
reinforced by the fact that we neglected the low-wage employer payroll tax cut 
schemes that were set up in France since the mid-1990s in order to boost low-skill 
labor demand. As of 2005, the 42.5% employer payroll tax rate was reduced to 
24.5% at the minimum wage level, and increased linearly up to the statutory 42.5% 
rate at the level of 1.6 minimum wages (the exemption corresponds to the health-
insurance and family-benefits components). However these low-wage payroll tax cut 
schemes change virtually every year, and they are difficult to properly take into 
account using income-tax-based income statistics (leaving alone the fact that they 
are mostly shifted on the employer side, due to high unemployment and the minimum 
wage constraint).  
 
Estate tax rates: estate tax rates for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,..,P99.99-100 were 
computed using top estate fractiles borrowed from Piketty (2001, Appendix J).
9 In the 
same way as for the United States, we computed estate tax rates using estate 
fractiles (estate fractiles were defined using the population of all adult decedents, 
including those with no wealth at death), and we then assume that those taxes are 
borne by the corresponding fractiles of income tax returns. Updated estate tax 
schedules for 2005 are available on www.impots.gouv.fr (they were virtually 
                                            
9 Estate tax tabulations and micro-files unfortunately do not exist on an annual basis in France (see 
Piketty (2001, Appendix J). For 2005, we updated the 1994 figures using the 1994-2005 income 
growth rate. For 1970, we updated the 1964 figures using the 1964-1970 income growth rate. unchanged since 1984, when the top marginal rate was raised from 20% to 40%). 
Estate tax schedules for 1970 are given in Piketty (2001, Appendix J). In France, 
estate tax rates are vastly higher when estates are transmitted to indivuals outside 
the family (or even to brothers and sisters) than when they are transmitted to 
spouses and children  (so-called “transmission en ligne directe”, “direct line estate”). 
We used the “direct-line” estate tax schedules, but we then scaled up effective rates 
so as to match observed estate tax receipts for 1970 and 2005 (receipts are available 
in published estate tax tabulations).   
 
Wealth tax rates: wealth tax (“impôt sur la fortune”, ISF) rates for fractiles P0-90, 
P90-95,..,P99.99-100 were computed using top wealth fractiles borrowed from 
Piketty (2001b, statistical appendix).
10 The wealth tax currently applied in France did 
not exist in 1970: it was created in 1981 following the election of the socialist 
government (“impôt sur les grandes fortunes”, IGF), repealed in 1986, and reinstated 
again in 1989 (“impôt sur la fortune”, ISF) to finance the minimum income scheme 
(RMI) introduced by the new socialist government. As of 2005, the wealth tax applies 
to all tax units with total wealth above 750,000 € (about 1% of all tax units), and the 
top marginal rate (above 15.5 millions €) is 1.8% (see www.impots.gouv.fr for the full 
schedule). We applied the 2005 schedules to 2005 top wealth fractiles (fractiles were 
defined using the population of all tax units). Because we could not take into account 
all tax exemptions and tax loopholes, this leads to a slight overestimate of tax 
receipts, so we scaled down all rates to reproduce tax receipts. In the same way as 
for the estate tax, we then assumes that those taxes are borne by the corresponding 
fractiles of income tax returns. 
 
Table A5 provides the real income levels for each group, along with the tax rates for 
each of the taxes estimated for France in 1970 and 2005. 
 
B.2 United Kingdom 
 
Income levels: net-of-payroll-tax income levels for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,...,P99,99-
100 are borrowed from Aktinson (2006). These were computed using published tax 
                                            
10 For 2005, we updated the 2000 figures using the 1990-2000 annual average wealthgrowth rate. tabulations annually available and reported in Inland Revenue Statistics. Those 
estimates exclude realized capital gains. In contrast to the French and US case, the 
UK income estimates do not include realized capital gains. Finally, employer payroll 
taxes are added to the average income of each fractile and incorporated into the 
wage income component, using the methodology described below. It is important to 
note that, in contrast to the US and French cases, the top group for the UK in 
Atkinson (2006) series is P99.95-100 and not P99.99-100. As a result, we have also 
had to use P99.95-100 as our top group for the UK case. 
 
Individual Income tax rates: income tax rates for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,...,P99.95-
100 are estimated from Atkinson (2006) who reports top income shares both pre-tax 
and post-tax. Tax rates are estimated as one minus the ratio of post tax shares to pre 
tax shares multiplied by the ratio of pre tax to post tax total income. It should be 
noted that post tax shares in Atkinson (2006) are estimated based on tax units 
ranked by post-tax income (instead of pre-tax income for France and the United 
States). This would tend to make UK income tax rates slightly lower than US and 
French tax rates. Because ranking of incomes pre and post tax must be very close, 
this effect is probably almost negligible. The individual income tax does not include 
the supplementary tax on realized capital gains. 
 
Payroll tax rates:  
In 1970, payroll tax financing social security on employees is 7% of earnings below a 
cap (close to average earnings) and the payroll tax financing social security on 
employers is 8% of earnings below the same cap.
11 The cap applies to weekly 
earnings and the annual value of the cap is around 1,000 Pounds. In 2000, payroll 
tax on employees is 10% of earnings between 4,000 and 28,000 Pounds. The payroll 
tax on employer is 12.2% of earnings above 4,000 Pounds with no cap. The 
threshold and cap also apply at the weekly level which we have annualised. Payroll 
taxes in the UK finance primarily the Universal government provided health insurance 
system, and hence can be considered as a pure tax. We have used the 
decomposition of income into labor and capital income components reported in 
                                            
11 There was also an additiona small payroll tax on the workforce (which did not finance social security 
programs) which is excluded from the study but reported included the payroll tax statistics from OECD 
reported on Table A4 which explains the (small) discrepency between the total payroll tax rate used in 
the study and the OECD payroll tax rate. Exlcuding this tax has only very minor effects on top groups.  Atkinson (2006) to estimate corresponding payroll tax rates using the same 
methodology as in the case of France.  
 
Estate tax rates: estate tax rates for fractiles P0-90, P90-95,..,P99.95-100 were 
computed using estate tax statistics. In the same way as for the US and France, we 
computed estate tax rates using estate fractiles (estate fractiles were defined using 
the population of all decedents, including those with no wealth at death), and we then 
assumes that those taxes are borne by the corresponding fractiles of income tax 
returns. Estate tax statistics for the United Kingdom are published in Inland Revenue 
Statistics (various years). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (8)
Tax Units Number of (2)/(1) Average income
tax returns (%) (nominal $)
('000s) ('000s)
1960 68,681 61,028 88.9 5,175
1961 69,997 61,499 87.9
1962 71,254 62,712 88.0 5,472
1963 72,464 63,943 88.2
1964 73,660 65,376 88.8 6,119
1965 74,772 67,596 90.4
1966 75,831 70,160 92.5 7,018
1967 76,856 71,652 93.2 7,440
1968 77,826 73,729 94.7 8,122
1969 78,793 75,834 96.2 8,559
1970 79,924 74,280 92.9 8,838
1971 81,849 74,576 91.1 9,302
1972 83,670 77,573 92.7 10,089
1973 85,442 80,693 94.4 10,954
1974 87,228 83,340 95.5 11,688
1975 89,127 82,229 92.3 12,015
1976 91,048 84,670 93.0 13,153
1977 93,076 86,635 93.1 14,170
1978 95,213 89,771 94.3 15,562
1979 97,457 92,694 95.1 17,202
1980 99,625 93,902 94.3 18,412
1981 101,432 95,396 94.0 19,891
1982 103,250 95,337 92.3 20,526
1983 105,067 96,321 91.7 21,563
1984 106,871 99,439 93.0 23,298
1985 108,736 101,660 93.5 24,666
1986 110,684 103,045 93.1 26,433
1987 112,640 106,996 95.0 26,817
1988 114,656 109,708 95.7 29,194
1989 116,759 112,136 96.0 30,222
1990 120,447 113,717 94.4 30,756
1991 120,453 114,730 95.2 31,199
1992 121,944 113,605 93.2 32,357
1993 123,378 114,602 92.9 32,987
1994 124,716 115,943 93.0 34,345
1995 126,023 118,218 93.8 36,401
1996 127,798 120,351 94.2 38,660
1997 129,532 122,422 94.5 41,539
1998 131,720 124,771 94.7 44,204
1999 133,233 127,075 95.4 47,133
2000 134,473 129,374 96.2 50,122
2001 137,088 130,255 95.0 47,968
2002 139,703 130,076 93.1
2003 141,843 130,424 91.9
2004 143,982 132,385 91.9
Notes: Population and tax units estimates based on census and current population surveys.
Tax units estimated as sum of married men, divorced and widowed men and women, and singles men and 
women aged 20 and over. Income defined as market income reported on income tax 
returns plus employer federal payroll taxes and imputed corporate taxes. 
Income includes all realized capital gains reported on tax returns.
Income of non-filers is imputed as 20% of average income.
TABLE A0. Reference Totals for Tax Units and Income, 1960-2004
Tax Units and PopulationTop 20% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.5 P99.5-99.9 P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100
1960 49.27 33.09 22.69 10.07 7.02 3.01 0.93 7.58 15.59 23.84 16.19 10.42 12.63 3.06 4.01 2.08 0.93
1962 50.25 33.60 22.86 10.00 6.92 2.90 0.87 7.39 15.55 24.18 16.65 10.73 12.81 3.05 3.97 2.01 0.86
1964 50.84 34.23 23.52 10.44 7.27 3.10 0.97 7.29 15.32 24.26 16.61 10.70 13.06 3.16 4.14 2.12 0.97
1966 50.35 33.88 23.35 10.43 7.26 3.17 1.00 7.59 15.47 24.23 16.47 10.52 12.90 3.16 4.06 2.16 0.99
1967 50.80 34.37 23.77 10.71 7.50 3.23 0.97 7.66 15.41 23.97 16.42 10.60 13.06 3.20 4.26 2.26 0.96
1968 51.16 34.75 24.19 11.13 7.87 3.43 1.02 7.81 15.36 23.90 16.41 10.57 13.05 3.26 4.44 2.40 1.01
1969 50.46 33.77 23.15 10.31 7.25 3.18 1.02 8.11 15.78 24.48 16.69 10.62 12.82 3.06 4.06 2.15 1.01
1970 49.29 32.47 21.71 9.09 6.20 2.55 0.77 8.06 15.73 24.48 16.82 10.76 12.60 2.87 3.63 1.76 0.76
1971 49.93 32.93 22.06 9.24 6.33 2.63 0.79 7.63 15.39 24.49 17.00 10.87 12.80 2.90 3.69 1.83 0.78
1972 49.79 32.83 21.95 9.19 6.26 2.59 0.80 8.02 15.43 24.48 16.96 10.88 12.75 2.92 3.66 1.79 0.79
1973 49.73 32.72 21.82 8.82 5.94 2.38 0.67 7.95 15.43 24.68 17.00 10.89 12.98 2.86 3.55 1.69 0.66
1974 50.11 32.96 21.94 8.98 6.09 2.49 0.71 8.16 15.36 24.65 17.15 11.01 12.94 2.88 3.58 1.76 0.70
1975 50.63 33.06 21.77 8.76 5.89 2.38 0.71 7.46 14.96 24.78 17.56 11.29 13.00 2.85 3.50 1.66 0.70
1976 50.52 32.98 21.72 8.73 5.90 2.40 0.72 7.69 14.96 24.75 17.54 11.25 12.98 2.82 3.49 1.67 0.71
1977 50.63 33.10 21.82 8.80 5.95 2.43 0.72 7.59 14.92 24.79 17.52 11.28 13.01 2.84 3.51 1.70 0.71
1978 50.65 33.06 21.79 8.78 5.95 2.44 0.72 7.75 14.84 24.69 17.58 11.27 12.99 2.82 3.50 1.72 0.71
1979 50.93 33.49 22.34 9.42 6.56 2.94 0.99 7.90 14.72 24.38 17.44 11.15 12.91 2.85 3.62 1.94 0.99
1980 51.48 33.81 22.45 9.28 6.40 2.76 0.86 7.63 14.64 24.39 17.66 11.36 13.16 2.87 3.63 1.90 0.86
1981 51.45 33.56 22.04 9.01 6.24 2.73 0.87 7.64 14.64 24.56 17.88 11.53 13.02 2.76 3.50 1.85 0.87
1982 52.76 34.70 23.04 9.84 7.01 3.31 1.15 7.24 14.12 24.45 18.06 11.66 13.19 2.83 3.70 2.15 1.15
1983 53.58 35.55 23.78 10.37 7.48 3.58 1.27 6.95 13.93 24.27 18.03 11.77 13.41 2.89 3.90 2.31 1.27
1984 53.74 35.84 24.13 10.73 7.86 3.92 1.42 7.19 14.05 23.99 17.90 11.71 13.40 2.87 3.94 2.50 1.42
1985 54.35 36.49 24.76 11.20 8.23 4.07 1.45 7.17 13.91 23.78 17.86 11.73 13.55 2.97 4.17 2.61 1.45
1986 55.94 38.34 26.68 12.74 9.52 5.01 2.00 6.88 13.62 23.50 17.60 11.66 13.94 3.22 4.52 3.01 2.01
1987 55.16 37.44 25.70 11.90 8.74 4.31 1.55 6.93 13.63 23.52 17.73 11.73 13.80 3.16 4.42 2.76 1.54
1988 56.97 39.91 28.53 14.78 11.40 6.18 2.44 6.74 13.10 22.54 17.05 11.38 13.74 3.38 5.22 3.74 2.43
1989 56.69 39.48 27.92 13.95 10.55 5.56 2.15 6.84 13.06 22.65 17.21 11.56 13.96 3.40 4.99 3.40 2.15
1990 57.11 39.75 28.07 13.96 10.58 5.47 2.13 6.56 13.04 22.70 17.36 11.68 14.10 3.38 5.09 3.34 2.12
1991 56.71 39.19 27.36 13.02 9.64 4.80 1.78 6.67 13.06 22.77 17.52 11.83 14.33 3.37 4.83 3.02 1.77
1992 58.00 40.64 28.82 14.37 10.88 5.72 2.22 6.22 12.63 22.37 17.36 11.82 14.45 3.49 5.15 3.49 2.22
1993 57.96 40.47 28.57 13.93 10.43 5.38 2.03 6.23 12.62 22.32 17.50 11.90 14.63 3.49 5.04 3.35 2.02
1994 57.97 40.51 28.66 14.01 10.47 5.36 2.02 6.27 12.55 22.20 17.46 11.85 14.65 3.54 5.10 3.33 2.02
1995 58.51 41.37 29.52 14.72 11.05 5.70 2.09 6.24 12.40 21.85 17.14 11.84 14.79 3.67 5.36 3.60 2.08
1996 59.39 42.52 30.84 15.90 12.12 6.44 2.47 6.20 12.14 21.36 16.86 11.68 14.94 3.78 5.68 3.98 2.47
1997 60.07 43.54 32.05 17.00 13.12 7.21 2.71 6.15 12.01 20.99 16.52 11.49 15.05 3.87 5.92 4.52 2.71
1998 60.43 44.14 32.74 17.68 13.73 7.61 2.93 6.16 11.85 20.70 16.29 11.40 15.07 3.95 6.13 4.70 2.93
1999 61.12 44.96 33.60 18.37 14.36 8.02 3.09 6.05 11.58 20.34 16.16 11.36 15.23 4.02 6.36 4.94 3.09
2000 62.13 46.20 34.90 19.63 15.52 8.91 3.47 6.10 11.46 20.01 15.93 11.29 15.28 4.11 6.63 5.46 3.48
2001 60.20 43.63 31.95 16.88 13.06 7.12 2.75 6.14 11.91 20.78 16.57 11.68 15.07 3.82 5.94 4.38 2.75
Notes: Computations by authors on tax return statistics. Taxpayers are ranked by gross income (excluding capital gains and government transfers).
Income of non-filers is imputed as 20% of average income. Groups defined relative to all tax units (filers and non-filers).
Income include employer payroll taxes, realized capital gains, and imputed corporate taxes.
Table A1. Pre-tax Top Income Shares in the United States, 1960-2001Top 20% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top .5% Top .1% Top .01% P20-40 P40-60 P60-80 P80-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.5 P99.5-99.9 P99.9-99.99 P99.99-100
1960 47.36 30.32 19.50 7.13 4.55 1.53 0.34 8.31 16.68 25.26 17.02 10.78 12.30 2.57 2.99 1.19 0.34
1962 47.56 30.19 19.17 6.88 4.36 1.46 0.32 7.86 16.35 25.38 17.35 10.98 12.22 2.51 2.88 1.13 0.32
1964 48.09 30.72 19.71 7.13 4.51 1.51 0.34 7.76 16.12 25.45 17.34 10.97 12.48 2.60 2.96 1.16 0.35
1966 47.77 30.58 19.73 7.23 4.61 1.61 0.39 8.10 16.20 25.29 17.16 10.81 12.41 2.61 2.96 1.22 0.39
1967 48.49 31.40 20.49 7.77 5.04 1.81 0.44 8.13 16.06 24.89 17.05 10.87 12.64 2.70 3.20 1.37 0.44
1968 48.29 31.21 20.33 7.67 4.97 1.75 0.41 8.40 16.21 24.97 17.04 10.83 12.55 2.67 3.17 1.33 0.41
1969 48.07 30.72 19.79 7.28 4.70 1.68 0.43 8.65 16.47 25.39 17.31 10.89 12.41 2.55 2.97 1.23 0.43
1970 47.08 29.62 18.56 6.26 3.85 1.20 0.25 8.57 16.36 25.31 17.44 11.03 12.23 2.39 2.62 0.94 0.25
1971 47.84 30.26 19.06 6.51 4.03 1.27 0.26 8.17 15.97 25.21 17.56 11.15 12.46 2.46 2.72 1.00 0.27
1972 47.52 30.03 18.91 6.53 4.07 1.33 0.30 8.67 16.07 25.20 17.46 11.08 12.31 2.45 2.71 1.01 0.30
1973 47.47 29.98 18.88 6.35 3.93 1.26 0.26 8.64 16.08 25.30 17.47 11.07 12.48 2.40 2.66 0.99 0.26
1974 47.85 30.37 19.22 6.64 4.16 1.39 0.30 8.85 16.05 25.24 17.47 11.13 12.54 2.48 2.76 1.08 0.30
1975 47.96 30.13 18.76 6.26 3.87 1.25 0.28 8.35 15.83 25.42 17.81 11.35 12.46 2.39 2.61 0.96 0.28
1976 47.98 30.14 18.78 6.26 3.88 1.26 0.27 8.46 15.78 25.43 17.81 11.35 12.47 2.37 2.61 0.98 0.28
1977 47.99 30.13 18.71 6.26 3.90 1.30 0.30 8.43 15.78 25.46 17.85 11.40 12.42 2.35 2.59 1.00 0.30
1978 48.42 30.51 19.08 6.53 4.12 1.42 0.34 8.50 15.51 25.22 17.91 11.41 12.52 2.41 2.69 1.08 0.34
1979 47.74 30.24 19.17 6.96 4.55 1.77 0.52 8.94 15.72 25.12 17.49 11.04 12.17 2.39 2.76 1.24 0.52
1980 48.28 30.62 19.44 7.03 4.58 1.74 0.48 8.70 15.68 25.11 17.64 11.17 12.37 2.44 2.83 1.26 0.48
1981 48.31 30.55 19.32 7.03 4.64 1.82 0.53 8.73 15.68 25.21 17.75 11.21 12.26 2.38 2.80 1.29 0.53
1982 50.23 32.33 20.90 8.22 5.68 2.53 0.85 8.15 15.01 24.92 17.89 11.42 12.64 2.54 3.13 1.67 0.85
1983 51.14 33.23 21.71 8.75 6.10 2.73 0.93 7.79 14.79 24.77 17.90 11.50 12.92 2.64 3.36 1.80 0.93
1984 51.33 33.53 22.07 9.10 6.47 3.04 1.06 8.00 14.88 24.47 17.78 11.45 12.92 2.62 3.42 1.98 1.06
1985 51.92 34.17 22.70 9.57 6.82 3.18 1.10 8.01 14.76 24.25 17.74 11.46 13.09 2.74 3.63 2.08 1.10
1986 53.52 36.05 24.66 11.11 8.12 4.10 1.62 7.69 14.46 23.95 17.45 11.36 13.48 2.98 4.00 2.47 1.62
1987 52.42 34.66 23.19 10.03 7.18 3.38 1.17 7.82 14.59 24.17 17.75 11.45 13.15 2.85 3.79 2.22 1.17
1988 54.60 37.60 26.47 13.23 10.12 5.42 2.12 7.57 13.93 23.02 16.99 11.12 13.23 3.10 4.70 3.30 2.12
1989 54.29 37.14 25.87 12.41 9.30 4.81 1.83 7.70 13.89 23.14 17.14 11.26 13.42 3.11 4.48 2.98 1.83
1990 54.75 37.47 26.11 12.53 9.41 4.80 1.84 7.41 13.89 23.16 17.27 11.35 13.57 3.12 4.60 2.96 1.84
1991 54.21 36.76 25.23 11.43 8.33 4.04 1.47 7.60 13.94 23.24 17.45 11.52 13.78 3.10 4.28 2.57 1.47
1992 55.35 37.97 26.42 12.53 9.36 4.83 1.86 7.16 13.62 22.92 17.38 11.54 13.87 3.17 4.53 2.97 1.86
1993 54.86 37.22 25.53 11.44 8.31 4.08 1.49 7.26 13.74 23.09 17.63 11.68 14.06 3.13 4.22 2.59 1.49
1994 54.50 36.87 25.25 11.28 8.17 3.99 1.47 7.45 13.77 23.02 17.62 11.61 13.94 3.11 4.18 2.52 1.47
1995 54.85 37.49 25.84 11.75 8.57 4.22 1.51 7.50 13.64 22.72 17.35 11.64 14.06 3.17 4.35 2.71 1.51
1996 55.62 38.53 27.02 12.78 9.50 4.87 1.83 7.46 13.41 22.27 17.09 11.49 14.20 3.27 4.63 3.04 1.83
1997 56.44 39.73 28.42 14.03 10.62 5.68 2.11 7.39 13.20 21.82 16.69 11.29 14.34 3.41 4.92 3.58 2.11
1998 56.69 40.18 28.97 14.62 11.16 6.04 2.30 7.39 13.06 21.61 16.49 11.19 14.30 3.46 5.12 3.74 2.30
1999 57.33 40.96 29.79 15.33 11.80 6.46 2.47 7.26 12.80 21.30 16.36 11.14 14.42 3.52 5.33 3.99 2.47
2000 58.41 42.24 31.13 16.60 12.95 7.32 2.83 7.30 12.62 20.95 16.14 11.08 14.50 3.64 5.63 4.49 2.83
2001 56.42 39.69 28.30 14.03 10.67 5.69 2.18 7.38 13.20 21.73 16.71 11.38 14.24 3.35 4.98 3.51 2.18
Notes: Computations by authors on tax return statistics. Taxpayers are ranked by gross income (excluding capital gains and government transfers).
Income of non-filers is imputed as 20% of average income. Groups defined relative to all tax units (filers and non-filers).
Income include employer payroll taxes, realized capital gains, and imputed corporate taxes.
Taxes include federal individual, payroll, corporate, and estate and gift taxes.
Table A2. Post-tax Top Income Shares in the United States, 1960-2001All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate
1960 21.4 11.4 3.5 6.0 0.6 1960 24.5 15.0 2.4 5.9 1.2 1960 28.0 16.9 1.7 7.6 1.8 1960 32.5 18.8 1.1 9.8 2.7
1962 21.9 11.9 3.7 5.8 0.6 1962 26.1 15.2 2.5 7.3 1.1 1962 29.8 16.9 1.8 9.3 1.8 1962 34.5 18.8 1.3 11.8 2.7
1964 21.1 10.9 3.8 5.8 0.6 1964 25.3 14.1 2.4 7.6 1.3 1964 29.2 15.9 1.7 9.6 2.0 1964 33.9 17.6 1.2 12.1 3.0
1966 22.4 10.8 5.1 5.9 0.6 1966 26.4 14.1 3.6 7.6 1.2 1966 30.0 15.9 2.6 9.7 1.9 1966 34.5 17.7 1.8 12.1 2.8
1967 22.0 11.0 5.2 5.2 0.5 1967 25.5 14.1 3.5 6.8 1.1 1967 28.7 15.8 2.5 8.7 1.7 1967 32.7 17.6 1.8 10.8 2.6
1968 24.0 12.5 5.1 5.7 0.6 1968 28.2 16.0 3.5 7.5 1.2 1968 31.7 18.0 2.5 9.4 1.8 1968 36.1 19.9 1.7 11.7 2.8
1969 24.5 12.8 5.8 5.4 0.5 1969 28.0 16.2 4.0 6.8 1.1 1969 31.3 18.0 2.9 8.6 1.8 1969 35.4 19.8 2.1 10.8 2.7
1970 23.3 12.5 5.8 4.3 0.7 1970 26.7 16.0 3.9 5.4 1.3 1970 30.0 18.0 2.9 7.0 2.1 1970 34.4 20.1 2.1 8.9 3.3
1971 22.4 11.3 6.0 4.4 0.7 1971 25.6 14.7 4.0 5.5 1.5 1971 28.7 16.4 3.0 7.0 2.3 1971 32.9 18.3 2.2 8.9 3.5
1972 22.8 11.7 6.2 4.3 0.6 1972 26.4 15.5 4.3 5.3 1.2 1972 29.4 17.6 3.2 6.7 1.9 1972 33.5 19.8 2.3 8.4 3.0
1973 24.5 12.1 7.3 4.6 0.5 1973 28.0 16.0 5.3 5.7 1.0 1973 30.9 18.1 3.9 7.2 1.6 1973 34.7 20.3 2.9 9.0 2.6
1974 24.8 12.2 7.7 4.4 0.5 1974 28.2 15.9 5.9 5.4 1.0 1974 30.7 17.9 4.4 6.9 1.5 1974 34.1 20.0 3.2 8.5 2.3
1975 24.4 12.1 7.7 4.1 0.5 1975 28.4 16.4 6.1 4.9 1.0 1975 31.1 18.8 4.6 6.1 1.6 1975 34.9 21.3 3.4 7.6 2.5
1976 24.7 11.9 7.6 4.6 0.6 1976 28.5 15.9 6.0 5.3 1.2 1976 31.2 18.1 4.6 6.6 1.9 1976 34.9 20.4 3.4 8.1 2.9
1977 24.1 11.4 7.6 4.7 0.4 1977 28.0 15.8 6.0 5.4 0.8 1977 30.9 18.4 4.6 6.7 1.2 1977 34.9 21.3 3.4 8.3 1.9
1978 24.2 11.3 7.8 4.8 0.4 1978 27.6 15.1 6.1 5.6 0.7 1978 30.1 17.5 4.6 6.8 1.2 1978 33.7 20.0 3.5 8.4 1.8
1979 26.3 13.2 8.3 4.4 0.4 1979 30.9 18.0 6.9 5.2 0.8 1979 33.5 20.4 5.4 6.4 1.2 1979 36.8 22.9 4.0 8.0 1.9
1980 26.6 14.1 8.3 3.8 0.4 1980 31.2 18.9 7.1 4.4 0.7 1980 33.6 21.4 5.6 5.4 1.2 1980 36.5 23.9 4.1 6.6 1.8
1981 27.4 14.6 9.1 3.3 0.4 1981 31.8 19.4 7.9 3.7 0.7 1981 33.9 21.9 6.4 4.5 1.1 1981 36.3 24.3 4.8 5.4 1.8
1982 25.3 13.6 9.2 2.3 0.3 1982 28.9 17.7 8.1 2.6 0.5 1982 30.4 19.9 6.5 3.2 0.8 1982 32.3 22.2 4.9 3.9 1.3
1983 24.8 12.7 9.1 2.7 0.3 1983 28.2 16.6 8.1 3.0 0.5 1983 29.7 18.6 6.7 3.5 0.8 1983 31.3 20.8 5.0 4.3 1.2
1984 25.3 12.6 9.4 3.0 0.3 1984 28.7 16.5 8.4 3.3 0.5 1984 30.2 18.6 6.9 4.0 0.8 1984 31.7 20.7 5.1 4.7 1.2
1985 25.2 12.7 9.4 2.8 0.3 1985 28.6 16.6 8.3 3.2 0.5 1985 30.0 18.6 6.8 3.8 0.8 1985 31.4 20.7 5.0 4.5 1.2
1986 25.2 12.9 9.2 2.9 0.2 1986 28.4 16.6 8.1 3.3 0.5 1986 29.6 18.5 6.5 3.9 0.7 1986 30.8 20.4 4.7 4.6 1.1
1987 25.6 12.5 9.5 3.4 0.2 1987 29.3 16.7 8.4 3.7 0.5 1987 31.1 19.2 6.9 4.3 0.7 1987 32.9 21.6 5.1 5.2 1.0
1988 25.7 12.6 9.5 3.3 0.3 1988 28.8 16.5 8.1 3.8 0.5 1988 30.0 18.5 6.4 4.4 0.7 1988 31.1 20.3 4.5 5.3 1.0
1989 25.8 12.6 9.6 3.3 0.3 1989 29.0 16.4 8.3 3.7 0.6 1989 30.2 18.4 6.6 4.4 0.9 1989 31.3 20.2 4.7 5.2 1.3
1990 25.8 12.4 9.9 3.2 0.3 1990 28.9 16.1 8.7 3.6 0.5 1990 30.1 18.1 7.0 4.1 0.8 1990 31.0 19.9 5.1 4.9 1.1
1991 25.6 12.2 10.1 2.9 0.3 1991 28.8 16.1 9.0 3.2 0.5 1991 30.2 18.2 7.4 3.8 0.8 1991 31.3 20.2 5.4 4.5 1.1
1992 25.8 12.5 10.0 3.0 0.3 1992 29.2 16.5 8.8 3.4 0.6 1992 30.7 18.7 7.2 3.9 0.8 1992 32.0 20.9 5.2 4.7 1.2
1993 26.7 12.8 10.1 3.4 0.4 1993 30.6 17.2 8.9 3.9 0.6 1993 32.6 19.8 7.3 4.5 0.9 1993 34.5 22.3 5.4 5.4 1.4
1994 27.2 12.9 10.3 3.7 0.3 1994 31.6 17.4 9.4 4.2 0.6 1994 33.7 19.9 8.0 4.9 0.9 1994 35.9 22.4 6.3 5.9 1.3
1995 27.6 13.2 10.1 3.9 0.4 1995 32.1 18.0 9.0 4.5 0.7 1995 34.4 20.6 7.6 5.2 1.0 1995 36.6 23.1 5.9 6.2 1.4
1996 27.8 13.7 9.8 3.9 0.4 1996 32.3 18.6 8.6 4.5 0.7 1996 34.6 21.2 7.2 5.2 1.0 1996 36.7 23.7 5.5 6.1 1.5
1997 27.5 13.7 9.5 3.8 0.5 1997 31.8 18.4 8.3 4.4 0.8 1997 33.8 20.8 6.8 5.1 1.1 1997 35.7 23.0 5.2 5.9 1.6
1998 27.1 13.7 9.4 3.5 0.5 1998 31.6 18.6 8.1 4.1 0.8 1998 33.7 21.1 6.7 4.7 1.2 1998 35.5 23.4 5.0 5.5 1.7
1999 27.4 14.3 9.2 3.4 0.4 1999 31.9 19.2 7.9 4.0 0.8 1999 33.8 21.7 6.5 4.6 1.1 1999 35.6 24.0 4.9 5.2 1.5
2000 27.4 14.6 9.1 3.3 0.4 2000 31.7 19.5 7.7 3.8 0.7 2000 33.6 22.0 6.3 4.4 1.0 2000 35.2 24.2 4.7 5.0 1.3
2001 25.8 13.1 9.8 2.5 0.4 2001 30.4 18.3 8.6 2.9 0.7 2001 32.5 21.0 7.2 3.4 0.9 2001 34.3 23.5 5.5 4.0 1.3
2004 23.4 11.5 9.3 2.3 0.4 2004 25.7 14.0 8.9 2.4 0.5 2004 27.4 16.1 8.0 2.7 0.6 2004 29.1 18.5 6.6 3.1 0.9
Notes: Computations are based on individual tax return micro data. Groups ranked by market income excluding realized capital gains. Income (used to compute taxes) includes employer payroll taxes, 
realized capital gains, and imputed corporate taxes. Individual income tax is computed using TAXSIM and assuming no deduction for state and local taxes.
Corporate taxes are imputed as a proportion to total personal capital income defined as all capital income reported on tax returns and returns imputed to pension funds (and imputed to labor income).
2004 tax rates are based on 2004 tax law applied to 2000 income adjusted for income growth.
Table A3. Average Tax Rates by Income Groups, 1960-2004
P0-100 P80-100 P90-100 P95-100All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate
1960 44.4 23.6 0.4 14.4 6.0 1960 49.1 25.8 0.3 15.6 7.5 1960 60.0 29.5 0.1 18.4 11.8 1960 71.4 31.5 0.0 22.3 17.6
1962 46.2 23.3 0.5 16.5 6.0 1962 50.8 25.3 0.4 17.7 7.4 1962 60.7 28.3 0.2 20.2 12.1 1962 71.0 29.1 0.1 23.6 18.2
1964 46.1 22.2 0.4 16.8 6.7 1964 51.0 24.2 0.3 18.2 8.4 1964 61.5 26.9 0.1 20.8 13.6 1964 72.1 27.6 0.0 24.2 20.3
1966 46.2 22.5 0.7 16.7 6.2 1966 50.8 24.6 0.5 17.9 7.8 1966 60.6 27.6 0.2 20.5 12.3 1966 70.2 28.5 0.1 23.5 18.1
1967 43.4 22.1 0.7 14.8 5.8 1967 47.5 23.9 0.5 15.9 7.2 1967 56.3 26.5 0.2 18.1 11.5 1967 64.9 27.2 0.1 20.5 17.0
1968 47.6 24.8 0.6 16.1 6.1 1968 52.0 26.7 0.4 17.3 7.6 1968 61.0 29.2 0.2 19.6 12.1 1968 69.4 29.2 0.1 21.8 18.4
1969 46.7 24.3 0.9 15.4 6.1 1969 51.0 26.0 0.6 16.7 7.7 1969 60.0 28.0 0.3 19.2 12.5 1969 68.0 27.1 0.1 22.0 18.9
1970 47.2 25.7 1.0 13.1 7.5 1970 52.4 28.0 0.7 14.3 9.4 1970 63.9 31.4 0.3 16.8 15.4 1970 75.2 31.8 0.1 19.9 23.4
1971 45.4 23.4 1.0 12.9 8.2 1971 50.6 25.5 0.7 14.1 10.3 1971 62.4 28.6 0.3 16.5 17.0 1971 74.1 28.8 0.1 19.4 25.8
1972 45.2 25.3 1.0 11.9 7.0 1972 49.9 27.5 0.8 12.8 8.8 1972 60.5 30.8 0.4 14.9 14.5 1972 70.8 31.3 0.1 17.5 21.8
1973 45.7 26.0 1.3 12.4 6.0 1973 50.1 28.1 1.0 13.4 7.6 1973 60.1 31.4 0.5 15.7 12.5 1973 70.8 32.5 0.2 18.5 19.6
1974 44.4 25.6 1.5 11.9 5.3 1974 48.6 28.0 1.1 12.9 6.7 1974 58.0 31.8 0.5 15.1 10.5 1974 67.7 33.5 0.2 17.8 16.2
1975 45.9 27.7 1.6 10.8 5.9 1975 50.4 30.2 1.2 11.6 7.4 1975 60.3 34.1 0.6 13.8 11.8 1975 70.2 35.6 0.2 16.7 17.8
1976 46.1 26.2 1.6 11.5 6.8 1976 50.5 28.4 1.2 12.3 8.6 1976 60.6 31.8 0.6 14.4 13.7 1976 71.3 33.2 0.2 17.5 20.3
1977 46.0 28.3 1.6 11.6 4.5 1977 50.3 31.1 1.2 12.4 5.6 1977 59.2 35.3 0.6 14.5 8.9 1977 68.0 37.0 0.2 17.6 13.2
1978 43.6 26.3 1.6 11.5 4.2 1978 47.6 28.8 1.2 12.4 5.2 1978 56.0 32.5 0.6 14.7 8.2 1978 64.4 34.3 0.2 17.8 12.1
1979 45.6 28.4 1.8 11.0 4.3 1979 48.9 30.3 1.3 12.0 5.4 1979 55.7 32.4 0.6 14.4 8.3 1979 61.5 32.0 0.2 17.4 12.0
1980 44.4 29.3 1.9 9.1 4.1 1980 47.5 31.3 1.4 9.8 5.1 1980 53.7 33.7 0.6 11.6 7.8 1980 59.6 34.7 0.2 13.8 11.0
1981 43.3 29.3 2.3 7.6 4.2 1981 46.0 30.9 1.6 8.3 5.2 1981 51.5 33.0 0.7 9.9 7.9 1981 56.1 32.8 0.2 12.0 11.1
1982 37.6 27.0 2.2 5.5 2.9 1982 39.6 28.4 1.5 6.1 3.6 1982 43.0 29.7 0.6 7.5 5.2 1982 44.9 29.1 0.2 8.9 6.7
1983 36.5 25.4 2.2 6.1 2.8 1983 38.6 27.0 1.5 6.7 3.3 1983 42.5 29.1 0.6 8.0 4.7 1983 45.1 29.8 0.2 9.3 5.8
1984 36.7 25.2 2.3 6.6 2.6 1984 38.6 26.6 1.5 7.3 3.1 1984 42.2 28.7 0.6 8.6 4.2 1984 44.5 29.3 0.2 10.0 5.0
1985 36.1 25.0 2.2 6.4 2.6 1985 38.1 26.5 1.4 7.1 3.1 1985 41.5 28.4 0.6 8.3 4.2 1985 43.2 28.8 0.2 9.1 5.1
1986 34.7 24.0 2.0 6.3 2.4 1986 36.2 25.1 1.3 6.9 2.9 1986 38.8 26.3 0.5 8.1 4.0 1986 39.3 25.7 0.1 8.7 4.7
1987 37.3 26.1 2.2 6.9 2.1 1987 38.9 27.6 1.5 7.4 2.4 1987 41.6 29.5 0.6 8.4 3.1 1987 43.8 29.9 0.2 10.0 3.7
1988 33.5 23.2 1.7 6.8 1.8 1988 34.1 23.7 1.1 7.3 2.0 1988 34.9 23.9 0.4 8.2 2.4 1988 35.4 23.6 0.1 9.2 2.5
1989 34.0 22.9 1.9 6.8 2.3 1989 34.6 23.5 1.2 7.3 2.6 1989 35.8 23.7 0.5 8.4 3.2 1989 36.8 23.6 0.1 9.5 3.6
1990 33.4 22.8 2.0 6.5 2.0 1990 34.0 23.4 1.3 7.0 2.3 1990 35.0 23.7 0.5 7.9 2.8 1990 35.8 23.5 0.1 9.1 3.1
1991 34.7 24.0 2.3 6.1 2.2 1991 35.7 25.0 1.6 6.6 2.5 1991 37.4 26.0 0.6 7.5 3.1 1991 38.5 26.1 0.2 8.7 3.6
1992 35.3 24.7 2.2 6.3 2.2 1992 36.2 25.7 1.4 6.7 2.4 1992 37.4 26.6 0.5 7.4 2.9 1992 38.0 26.8 0.1 8.0 3.1
1993 39.8 27.6 2.3 7.3 2.6 1993 41.6 29.3 1.5 7.9 2.9 1993 44.5 31.3 0.6 8.9 3.6 1993 46.0 31.8 0.2 10.0 4.0
1994 41.4 27.5 3.4 8.0 2.4 1994 43.2 29.0 2.7 8.7 2.7 1994 45.9 30.8 1.6 10.1 3.4 1994 47.1 30.9 1.0 11.5 3.8
1995 42.2 28.2 3.2 8.2 2.6 1995 43.9 29.6 2.6 8.8 2.9 1995 46.3 31.2 1.6 10.1 3.5 1995 47.8 31.6 1.0 11.2 4.0
1996 41.9 28.4 3.0 7.9 2.7 1996 43.3 29.6 2.4 8.4 3.0 1996 45.4 30.8 1.5 9.5 3.6 1996 46.5 31.1 1.0 10.4 4.0
1997 40.1 27.0 2.8 7.5 2.9 1997 41.3 28.0 2.2 7.9 3.2 1997 42.8 28.9 1.4 8.8 3.7 1997 43.6 29.5 1.1 9.1 4.0
1998 39.7 27.3 2.7 6.8 2.9 1998 40.8 28.2 2.2 7.2 3.2 1998 42.2 29.2 1.5 7.8 3.7 1998 42.7 29.8 1.2 7.9 3.9
1999 39.4 27.8 2.6 6.4 2.5 1999 40.3 28.7 2.1 6.7 2.8 1999 41.4 29.7 1.5 7.1 3.1 1999 41.9 30.4 1.3 6.9 3.2
2000 38.6 27.7 2.5 6.1 2.3 2000 39.4 28.6 2.1 6.3 2.4 2000 40.3 29.5 1.5 6.6 2.7 2000 40.7 30.2 1.3 6.4 2.7
2001 38.3 27.9 3.0 5.1 2.2 2001 39.4 29.0 2.4 5.4 2.4 2001 40.7 30.3 1.7 5.9 2.8 2001 41.3 30.9 1.4 6.0 3.0
2004 30.4 20.8 5.1 3.5 1.1 2004 33.1 24.1 2.7 4.3 2.1 2004 33.6 24.8 2.1 4.4 2.2 2004 34.2 25.6 1.5 4.6 2.5
Table A3. Average Tax Rates by Income Groups, 1960-2004 (continued 2)
P99-100 P99.5-100 P99.9-100 P99.99-100All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate
1960 14.1 0.8 3.7 9.6 0.0 1960 13.9 4.9 4.1 4.9 0.0 1960 15.9 7.8 4.8 3.4 0.0 1960 16.7 9.4 4.9 2.5 0.0
1962 15.5 0.8 4.0 10.8 0.0 1962 16.9 5.0 4.6 7.3 0.0 1962 17.9 8.1 5.3 4.6 0.0 1962 18.0 9.8 5.0 3.2 0.0
1964 13.9 0.4 4.4 9.1 0.0 1964 16.0 4.1 4.7 7.2 0.0 1964 16.9 7.1 5.6 4.2 0.0 1964 17.2 8.9 5.1 3.2 0.0
1966 15.8 1.0 5.6 9.2 0.0 1966 17.3 4.5 6.0 6.8 0.0 1966 18.8 7.4 6.8 4.6 0.0 1966 19.1 8.9 7.0 3.2 0.0
1967 15.1 1.5 5.8 7.8 0.0 1967 17.2 5.1 6.4 5.7 0.0 1967 18.7 7.6 7.2 3.8 0.0 1967 19.0 9.0 7.1 2.9 0.0
1968 15.1 1.9 5.6 7.6 0.0 1968 18.2 6.1 5.9 6.1 0.0 1968 19.7 8.8 6.8 4.1 0.0 1968 20.6 10.3 7.1 3.2 0.0
1969 16.3 2.4 6.6 7.4 0.0 1969 19.5 6.6 6.9 5.9 0.0 1969 21.1 9.3 7.9 4.0 0.0 1969 21.7 10.9 7.8 3.0 0.0
1970 15.1 2.2 7.1 5.8 0.0 1970 18.5 6.2 7.0 5.3 0.0 1970 20.2 8.9 7.9 3.4 0.0 1970 20.7 10.6 7.7 2.4 0.0
1971 15.0 0.7 7.2 7.1 0.0 1971 16.9 3.9 7.4 5.6 0.0 1971 19.5 7.6 8.5 3.3 0.0 1971 20.1 9.6 8.0 2.6 0.0
1972 14.2 0.6 7.1 6.5 0.0 1972 16.6 3.8 7.4 5.4 0.0 1972 19.7 7.7 8.4 3.6 0.0 1972 20.6 9.6 8.3 2.7 0.0
1973 15.4 0.5 8.1 6.8 0.0 1973 18.0 4.4 8.4 5.3 0.0 1973 21.4 8.2 9.4 3.8 0.0 1973 22.6 10.2 9.6 2.9 0.0
1974 15.1 0.6 8.3 6.2 0.0 1974 18.4 5.0 8.6 4.8 0.0 1974 21.4 8.5 9.4 3.5 0.0 1974 23.0 10.4 9.9 2.7 0.0
1975 13.8 -0.4 8.6 5.5 0.0 1975 15.4 2.0 8.4 5.0 0.0 1975 20.0 7.3 9.3 3.4 0.0 1975 22.4 10.0 9.8 2.7 0.0
1976 15.2 0.5 8.3 6.5 0.0 1976 17.1 3.5 8.3 5.4 0.0 1976 20.6 7.4 9.1 4.1 0.0 1976 22.7 9.9 9.7 3.1 0.0
1977 14.4 -0.3 8.6 6.1 0.0 1977 15.7 1.9 8.3 5.4 0.0 1977 19.7 6.5 9.0 4.2 0.0 1977 22.0 9.1 9.6 3.3 0.0
1978 14.7 -0.2 8.8 6.1 0.0 1978 16.9 2.7 8.7 5.4 0.0 1978 20.8 7.2 9.3 4.4 0.0 1978 22.6 9.3 9.9 3.4 0.0
1979 14.5 -0.2 8.7 5.9 0.0 1979 16.6 3.0 8.9 4.7 0.0 1979 21.3 8.0 9.5 3.8 0.0 1979 24.1 10.9 10.0 3.1 0.0
1980 13.5 -0.3 9.2 4.6 0.0 1980 16.3 3.4 8.9 4.1 0.0 1980 21.4 8.6 9.4 3.5 0.0 1980 24.5 11.7 10.0 2.8 0.0
1981 13.7 -0.2 9.9 4.0 0.0 1981 17.1 4.0 9.6 3.5 0.0 1981 22.2 9.0 10.1 3.0 0.0 1981 25.5 12.3 10.7 2.4 0.0
1982 12.9 -0.2 10.5 2.7 0.0 1982 15.9 3.5 9.7 2.6 0.0 1982 20.6 8.3 10.3 2.0 0.0 1982 23.9 11.4 10.7 1.8 0.0
1983 13.9 0.3 9.5 4.0 0.0 1983 15.6 3.1 9.3 3.2 0.0 1983 20.2 7.6 10.0 2.6 0.0 1983 23.2 10.5 10.6 2.1 0.0
1984 14.2 0.0 9.8 4.3 0.0 1984 16.9 3.7 9.8 3.4 0.0 1984 20.9 7.7 10.4 2.8 0.0 1984 23.8 10.4 11.1 2.3 0.0
1985 14.2 0.2 10.0 4.0 0.0 1985 16.5 3.7 9.8 3.1 0.0 1985 20.7 7.7 10.4 2.7 0.0 1985 23.7 10.5 11.1 2.1 0.0
1986 14.1 0.6 9.2 4.3 0.0 1986 16.3 3.6 9.6 3.1 0.0 1986 20.5 7.7 10.2 2.7 0.0 1986 23.7 10.5 11.1 2.2 0.0
1987 16.0 0.4 10.1 5.5 0.0 1987 16.1 2.4 9.7 4.0 0.0 1987 20.4 6.7 10.5 3.2 0.0 1987 23.5 9.6 11.3 2.6 0.0
1988 16.1 0.9 11.0 4.2 0.0 1988 16.6 2.8 10.2 3.6 0.0 1988 21.1 7.1 11.0 2.9 0.0 1988 24.2 9.9 11.8 2.4 0.0
1989 15.5 0.5 11.2 3.8 0.0 1989 16.5 2.7 10.2 3.5 0.0 1989 21.2 7.3 11.0 2.9 0.0 1989 24.2 10.1 11.6 2.5 0.0
1990 15.9 0.3 11.6 4.0 0.0 1990 16.2 2.1 10.6 3.4 0.0 1990 21.0 7.0 11.2 2.8 0.0 1990 24.3 10.0 11.9 2.4 0.0
1991 15.5 0.1 11.3 4.1 0.0 1991 15.1 1.3 10.6 3.2 0.0 1991 20.5 6.6 11.3 2.6 0.0 1991 24.0 9.8 12.0 2.2 0.0
1992 15.6 -0.4 11.9 4.2 0.0 1992 14.7 0.6 10.7 3.4 0.0 1992 20.0 6.1 11.2 2.7 0.0 1992 24.0 9.7 12.2 2.2 0.0
1993 16.0 -0.3 11.1 5.2 0.0 1993 14.6 0.1 10.7 3.8 0.0 1993 20.2 6.0 11.3 3.0 0.0 1993 24.1 9.6 12.2 2.4 0.0
1994 14.6 -1.9 11.4 5.1 0.0 1994 13.5 -1.1 10.7 4.0 0.0 1994 20.1 5.7 11.4 3.0 0.0 1994 24.5 9.8 12.2 2.6 0.0
1995 13.3 -3.4 11.7 5.0 0.0 1995 13.0 -1.7 10.7 4.0 0.0 1995 20.4 5.9 11.3 3.2 0.0 1995 24.7 9.9 12.0 2.8 0.0
1996 13.7 -2.6 11.3 5.0 0.0 1996 13.1 -1.4 10.6 3.9 0.0 1996 20.2 5.9 11.2 3.1 0.0 1996 24.7 10.1 11.9 2.7 0.0
1997 12.8 -3.0 11.0 4.9 0.0 1997 12.8 -1.4 10.6 3.6 0.0 1997 20.3 6.1 11.1 3.0 0.0 1997 24.6 10.1 11.8 2.7 0.0
1998 12.9 -2.4 10.5 4.9 0.0 1998 12.6 -1.4 10.7 3.3 0.0 1998 19.7 5.8 11.1 2.8 0.0 1998 23.9 9.7 11.7 2.5 0.0
1999 12.7 -2.3 10.5 4.6 0.0 1999 12.8 -1.0 10.6 3.1 0.0 1999 19.7 6.1 11.1 2.6 0.0 1999 23.9 9.9 11.6 2.4 0.0
2000 12.8 -1.9 10.4 4.3 0.0 2000 13.1 -0.4 10.6 2.9 0.0 2000 20.0 6.4 11.2 2.4 0.0 2000 23.9 10.1 11.6 2.2 0.0
2001 11.4 -3.9 12.3 3.1 0.0 2001 10.7 -2.5 10.9 2.4 0.0 2001 17.8 4.3 11.5 1.9 0.0 2001 22.4 8.8 11.9 1.7 0.0
2004 10.5 -2.9 10.4 3.0 0.0 2004 9.4 -3.2 10.6 2.0 0.0 2004 16.1 3.2 11.2 1.7 0.0 2004 20.5 7.3 11.6 1.6 0.0
Table A3. Average Tax Rates by Income Groups, 1960-2004 (continued 3)
P0-20 P20-40 P40-60 P60-80All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate
1960 17.4 11.2 3.8 2.4 0.0 1960 18.7 12.7 2.9 3.1 0.0 1960 23.5 14.9 1.7 6.3 0.6 1960 34.0 18.6 0.7 11.6 3.1
1962 18.6 11.6 3.8 3.2 0.0 1962 20.1 13.0 2.9 4.1 0.0 1962 25.5 15.3 1.9 7.8 0.6 1962 35.8 19.0 0.8 12.9 3.0
1964 17.6 10.5 3.8 3.2 0.0 1964 19.1 12.0 2.9 4.2 0.0 1964 24.6 14.1 1.7 8.1 0.6 1964 35.1 17.6 0.7 13.3 3.4
1966 19.2 10.4 5.5 3.3 0.0 1966 20.3 11.8 4.3 4.2 0.0 1966 25.4 13.8 2.7 8.3 0.6 1966 36.1 17.8 1.3 13.8 3.2
1967 19.0 10.5 5.5 3.0 0.0 1967 20.0 11.8 4.2 4.0 0.0 1967 24.5 13.9 2.7 7.4 0.6 1967 34.1 17.8 1.2 12.0 3.0
1968 21.0 12.0 5.8 3.3 0.0 1968 22.1 13.5 4.4 4.2 0.0 1968 26.9 15.8 2.6 7.9 0.6 1968 37.6 20.3 1.0 13.1 3.1
1969 21.6 12.6 6.1 3.0 0.0 1969 22.6 14.0 4.7 3.8 0.0 1969 26.9 16.2 3.0 7.1 0.6 1969 37.1 20.3 1.5 12.2 3.1
1970 20.5 12.2 5.8 2.4 0.0 1970 21.4 13.7 4.5 3.2 0.0 1970 25.6 16.1 3.0 5.7 0.7 1970 36.1 20.7 1.5 10.0 3.8
1971 19.9 11.2 6.0 2.7 0.0 1971 20.3 12.5 4.7 3.2 0.0 1971 24.4 14.8 3.1 5.9 0.7 1971 34.3 18.7 1.6 9.9 4.1
1972 20.5 11.6 6.3 2.6 0.0 1972 21.4 13.2 4.9 3.3 0.0 1972 25.5 15.8 3.3 5.8 0.6 1972 35.5 20.6 1.6 9.8 3.5
1973 22.5 11.9 7.8 2.8 0.0 1973 23.4 13.7 6.0 3.6 0.0 1973 27.5 16.5 3.9 6.6 0.5 1973 36.6 21.6 2.1 10.0 3.0
1974 23.4 12.0 8.8 2.6 0.0 1974 24.0 13.6 6.7 3.6 0.0 1974 27.1 16.1 4.5 6.0 0.5 1974 35.3 20.7 2.3 9.5 2.7
1975 23.3 11.9 8.8 2.6 0.0 1975 24.0 14.0 6.9 3.1 0.0 1975 27.5 17.1 4.7 5.3 0.5 1975 36.6 22.5 2.5 8.7 3.0
1976 23.6 11.9 8.8 2.9 0.0 1976 24.1 13.6 6.9 3.6 0.0 1976 27.7 16.6 4.7 5.8 0.6 1976 36.8 21.5 2.5 9.3 3.5
1977 22.7 10.9 8.8 3.0 0.0 1977 23.3 12.8 6.8 3.7 0.0 1977 27.5 16.5 4.6 6.0 0.4 1977 37.0 22.7 2.5 9.5 2.3
1978 22.8 10.8 8.8 3.3 0.0 1978 23.3 12.5 7.0 3.8 0.0 1978 27.0 15.8 4.7 6.2 0.4 1978 35.3 21.2 2.6 9.3 2.1
1979 26.1 13.2 9.9 2.9 0.0 1979 27.0 15.4 8.3 3.4 0.0 1979 30.5 19.0 5.5 5.6 0.4 1979 38.1 24.2 3.0 8.7 2.2
1980 26.7 14.2 10.0 2.6 0.0 1980 27.9 16.5 8.5 2.9 0.0 1980 31.0 20.1 5.7 4.8 0.4 1980 37.6 25.1 3.1 7.2 2.1
1981 27.9 14.8 10.8 2.3 0.0 1981 29.3 17.3 9.4 2.6 0.0 1981 31.6 20.8 6.6 3.9 0.4 1981 37.4 25.6 3.7 5.9 2.2
1982 26.1 13.5 11.0 1.6 0.0 1982 26.9 15.3 9.8 1.7 0.0 1982 28.5 18.7 6.9 2.6 0.3 1982 33.0 23.5 3.9 4.0 1.6
1983 25.3 12.5 10.9 1.9 0.0 1983 26.5 14.3 10.2 2.0 0.0 1983 27.5 17.2 7.2 2.9 0.3 1983 31.2 21.2 4.0 4.5 1.5
1984 25.8 12.4 11.3 2.1 0.0 1984 27.0 14.2 10.5 2.3 0.0 1984 28.0 17.1 7.4 3.2 0.3 1984 31.6 21.2 4.2 4.8 1.5
1985 25.7 12.4 11.4 2.0 0.0 1985 27.0 14.3 10.5 2.1 0.0 1985 27.8 17.2 7.4 3.0 0.3 1985 30.9 20.8 4.1 4.6 1.5
1986 25.8 12.4 11.3 2.0 0.0 1986 27.0 14.2 10.7 2.1 0.0 1986 27.6 17.0 7.3 3.1 0.2 1986 30.8 20.8 3.9 4.7 1.4
1987 25.5 11.5 11.6 2.4 0.0 1987 27.4 14.0 10.9 2.5 0.0 1987 29.1 17.7 7.5 3.6 0.2 1987 33.0 22.1 4.1 5.5 1.3
1988 26.0 11.7 12.2 2.2 0.0 1988 27.4 13.9 11.2 2.3 0.0 1988 28.5 17.3 7.5 3.5 0.3 1988 31.8 21.5 3.8 5.3 1.3
1989 26.2 11.8 12.1 2.3 0.0 1989 27.7 14.1 11.3 2.4 0.0 1989 28.7 17.4 7.5 3.5 0.3 1989 32.0 21.4 3.9 5.2 1.6
1990 26.2 11.7 12.4 2.2 0.0 1990 27.9 13.8 11.8 2.3 0.0 1990 28.6 17.0 8.1 3.3 0.3 1990 31.5 21.1 4.2 4.9 1.4
1991 25.8 11.4 12.4 2.0 0.0 1991 27.5 13.5 11.9 2.1 0.0 1991 28.4 16.8 8.2 3.1 0.3 1991 31.6 21.2 4.5 4.5 1.4
1992 25.7 11.3 12.4 2.0 0.0 1992 27.6 13.5 12.0 2.1 0.0 1992 28.8 17.1 8.3 3.1 0.3 1992 32.6 21.8 4.4 4.8 1.5
1993 26.1 11.4 12.4 2.3 0.0 1993 28.0 13.6 12.0 2.5 0.0 1993 29.5 17.3 8.4 3.5 0.3 1993 34.3 22.6 4.5 5.5 1.7
1994 26.5 11.6 12.5 2.5 0.0 1994 28.7 13.8 12.2 2.6 0.0 1994 30.7 17.5 9.0 3.8 0.3 1994 36.0 23.0 5.6 5.9 1.5
1995 26.7 11.7 12.3 2.6 0.0 1995 28.9 14.2 11.9 2.8 0.0 1995 31.2 18.1 8.6 4.1 0.3 1995 37.3 24.0 5.2 6.4 1.7
1996 26.8 12.0 12.2 2.6 0.0 1996 29.0 14.5 11.6 2.9 0.0 1996 31.4 18.6 8.2 4.1 0.4 1996 37.5 24.7 4.9 6.1 1.8
1997 26.7 12.1 12.0 2.6 0.0 1997 28.8 14.6 11.4 2.8 0.0 1997 30.9 18.4 8.0 4.1 0.4 1997 36.2 23.6 4.7 5.9 2.0
1998 26.2 11.8 12.0 2.4 0.0 1998 28.5 14.6 11.3 2.6 0.0 1998 30.9 18.8 7.8 3.9 0.4 1998 36.2 23.9 4.6 5.6 2.1
1999 26.4 12.2 11.9 2.4 0.0 1999 28.8 14.9 11.2 2.6 0.0 1999 31.2 19.4 7.6 3.8 0.4 1999 36.3 24.5 4.5 5.4 1.9
2000 26.4 12.2 11.9 2.3 0.0 2000 28.7 15.1 11.1 2.5 0.0 2000 31.1 19.6 7.5 3.6 0.4 2000 35.7 24.4 4.3 5.2 1.7
2001 25.1 11.1 12.3 1.7 0.0 2001 27.7 14.2 11.7 1.8 0.0 2001 29.8 18.5 8.3 2.7 0.3 2001 34.8 24.2 5.1 3.9 1.6
2004 22.7 9.2 11.9 1.6 0.0 2004 24.9 11.6 11.5 1.8 0.0 2004 27.2 16.4 8.1 2.5 0.1 2004 31.3 21.4 4.6 3.7 1.6
Table A3. Average Tax Rates by Income Groups, 1960-2004 (continued 4)
P80-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.5All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate All Indiv. Payroll Corp. Estate
1960 41.4 22.9 0.4 13.4 4.7 1960 55.3 28.7 0.2 16.7 9.7 1960 71.4 31.5 0.0 22.3 17.6
1962 43.4 23.4 0.5 14.9 4.6 1962 56.1 28.3 0.2 17.9 9.8 1962 70.7 29.4 0.1 23.0 18.2
1964 43.6 22.2 0.4 15.7 5.2 1964 56.9 26.8 0.2 18.8 11.1 1964 71.8 27.8 0.0 23.6 20.3
1966 43.4 22.4 0.8 15.3 4.9 1966 56.3 27.3 0.3 18.5 10.1 1966 69.6 28.8 0.1 22.7 18.1
1967 41.4 22.0 0.7 14.1 4.5 1967 52.7 26.3 0.3 16.8 9.3 1967 64.4 27.5 0.1 19.8 17.0
1968 45.7 24.8 0.6 15.6 4.8 1968 57.7 29.2 0.2 18.4 9.8 1968 69.0 29.4 0.1 21.1 18.4
1969 44.7 24.6 0.9 14.5 4.8 1969 56.7 28.5 0.4 17.7 10.2 1969 67.6 27.3 0.1 21.4 18.9
1970 44.6 25.8 0.9 12.0 5.8 1970 59.1 31.5 0.4 14.7 12.5 1970 74.6 32.2 0.1 19.0 23.4
1971 42.8 23.4 1.0 12.1 6.4 1971 57.7 28.7 0.4 14.9 13.7 1971 73.6 29.1 0.1 18.6 25.8
1972 42.9 25.3 1.1 11.0 5.5 1972 56.3 30.6 0.5 13.5 11.7 1972 70.4 31.5 0.1 16.9 21.8
1973 43.5 26.1 1.3 11.5 4.7 1973 55.9 31.2 0.6 14.0 10.0 1973 70.2 32.9 0.2 17.5 19.6
1974 42.0 25.5 1.5 10.8 4.2 1974 53.7 31.4 0.7 13.2 8.5 1974 67.0 34.0 0.2 16.6 16.2
1975 43.6 27.7 1.6 9.7 4.6 1975 56.0 33.8 0.7 11.8 9.6 1975 69.6 36.0 0.2 15.7 17.8
1976 43.7 26.2 1.6 10.4 5.4 1976 55.9 31.4 0.7 12.6 11.2 1976 70.7 33.6 0.2 16.6 20.3
1977 44.0 28.3 1.6 10.6 3.5 1977 55.4 34.7 0.7 12.7 7.2 1977 67.5 37.4 0.2 16.7 13.2
1978 41.7 26.3 1.7 10.4 3.3 1978 52.3 31.9 0.7 12.9 6.7 1978 63.9 34.8 0.2 16.8 12.1
1979 43.7 28.6 1.9 9.8 3.5 1979 53.0 32.7 0.8 12.7 6.8 1979 61.3 32.2 0.2 17.0 12.0
1980 43.0 29.4 1.9 8.3 3.3 1980 51.0 33.4 0.8 10.4 6.5 1980 59.3 34.9 0.2 13.3 11.0
1981 41.9 29.4 2.3 6.9 3.4 1981 49.5 33.1 1.0 8.8 6.6 1981 55.9 33.0 0.2 11.7 11.1
1982 36.8 27.2 2.4 4.8 2.4 1982 42.0 30.1 0.9 6.6 4.4 1982 44.7 29.2 0.2 8.7 6.7
1983 35.2 25.0 2.4 5.5 2.3 1983 41.1 28.7 0.9 7.3 4.2 1983 45.0 29.9 0.2 9.2 5.8
1984 35.2 24.5 2.5 6.0 2.2 1984 40.9 28.4 0.9 7.8 3.8 1984 44.5 29.3 0.2 10.1 5.0
1985 34.9 24.6 2.3 5.9 2.2 1985 40.6 28.2 0.8 7.9 3.7 1985 43.3 28.8 0.2 9.2 5.1
1986 33.8 23.8 2.2 5.8 2.0 1986 38.7 26.6 0.7 7.8 3.6 1986 39.7 25.6 0.1 9.3 4.7
1987 36.3 25.7 2.3 6.4 1.8 1987 40.4 29.2 0.9 7.5 2.8 1987 43.6 30.0 0.2 9.8 3.7
1988 33.2 23.4 2.0 6.2 1.6 1988 34.5 24.1 0.6 7.5 2.2 1988 35.3 23.6 0.1 9.0 2.5
1989 33.4 23.1 2.1 6.1 2.0 1989 35.0 23.9 0.7 7.5 3.0 1989 36.7 23.7 0.1 9.3 3.6
1990 33.0 23.1 2.2 5.8 1.8 1990 34.3 24.0 0.8 6.9 2.6 1990 35.4 23.6 0.1 8.7 3.1
1991 34.0 24.1 2.5 5.5 1.9 1991 36.5 26.1 0.9 6.6 2.9 1991 38.1 26.2 0.2 8.2 3.6
1992 34.8 24.7 2.4 5.8 1.9 1992 36.9 26.5 0.8 6.9 2.8 1992 37.9 26.9 0.1 7.8 3.1
1993 38.6 27.2 2.5 6.6 2.2 1993 43.5 31.0 0.8 8.2 3.4 1993 45.9 31.9 0.2 9.8 4.0
1994 40.4 27.2 3.8 7.2 2.1 1994 45.0 30.8 2.0 9.1 3.2 1994 46.9 31.1 1.0 11.1 3.8
1995 41.2 28.0 3.6 7.5 2.2 1995 45.5 31.0 1.9 9.3 3.3 1995 47.5 31.7 1.0 10.8 4.0
1996 41.1 28.1 3.3 7.3 2.3 1996 44.8 30.6 1.8 9.1 3.4 1996 46.5 31.1 1.0 10.5 4.0
1997 39.6 26.9 3.2 7.0 2.6 1997 42.5 28.5 1.6 8.9 3.5 1997 43.8 29.4 1.1 9.3 4.0
1998 39.2 26.9 3.0 6.6 2.7 1998 42.0 28.8 1.6 8.0 3.5 1998 42.9 29.7 1.2 8.1 3.9
1999 39.0 27.3 2.9 6.5 2.4 1999 41.4 29.2 1.6 7.5 3.0 1999 42.0 30.4 1.3 7.1 3.2
2000 38.4 27.3 2.8 6.1 2.1 2000 40.2 29.0 1.6 7.1 2.6 2000 40.8 30.1 1.3 6.6 2.7
2001 37.7 27.4 3.3 4.9 2.0 2001 40.4 30.0 1.9 5.9 2.7 2001 41.3 30.9 1.4 6.0 3.0
2004 33.0 23.8 3.0 4.3 1.9 2004 34.1 25.1 1.6 4.9 2.4 2004 34.7 26.2 1.4 4.6 2.5
Table A3. Average Tax Rates by Income Groups, 1960-2004 (continued 5)
P99.5-99.9 P99.9-99.99 P99.99-1001970 2004 1970 2000 1970 2005
A. Aggregates Estimates used in the study
Tax unit type Family Family Family Individual Family Family
Total number of units ('000s) 79,924 143,982 28,206 47,652 21,033 36,793
Total nominal personal income  706,353 7,202,824 36,104 701,771 76,708 1,200,050
Pre-tax real income per tax unit 43,021 50,026 13,926 14,727 22,103 32,616
Post-tax real income per tax unit
Individual income tax rate 12.52% 11.47% 17.06% 15.04% 5.33% 3.80%
Payroll tax rate 5.80% 9.26% 7.00% 8.31% 20.85% 33.35%
Corporate tax rate 4.33% 2.27%
Estate and wealth tax rate 0.65% 0.36% 1.06% 0.34% 0.26% 0.70%
Total tax rate (included in the study) 23.30% 23.36% 25.12% 23.69% 26.44% 37.85%
B. Average tax rates from OECD statistics
Year 1970 2003 1970 2000 1970 2003
Individual income tax rate 14.34% 13.72% 16.66% 14.88% 5.93% 4.01%
Payroll tax rate 6.30% 10.26% 9.71% 8.59% 20.73% 29.14%
Estate and wealth tax rate 0.66% 0.39% 1.06% 0.32% 0.40% 0.81%
Corporate tax rate 5.18% 3.13% 4.68% 4.94% 3.53% 3.30%
Consumption tax rate (excise, sales, and value added ta 7.82% 7.07% 15.21% 16.26% 21.09% 14.65%
Property tax rate (excluding estate and individual wealth 4.89% 4.31% 5.53% 5.51% 2.25% 3.39%
Other taxes 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.38% 2.05%
Total tax rate (including all taxes) 39.18% 38.89% 52.85% 50.50% 55.30% 57.35%
Fraction of all taxes included in the study 59.48% 60.07% 47.53% 46.91% 47.80% 66.00%
Notes: Computations are based on tax statistics and author's computations.
OECD tax statistics are based on OECD (2005), Revenue Statistics, 1965-2004. 
Nominal taxes reported in the OECD publication are divided by total nominal personal income estimated in the study.
Tax units in the United States and France are based on families. Tax units in the United Kingdom are based on families in 1970 and on individual adults in 2000.
Nominal incomes are reported in Millions of dollars for the US, Millions of pounds for the UK, and Millions of Euros for France. 
Individual income in all three countries includes all payroll taxes. Realized capital gains are included in France and the US but not the UK.
Corporate income taxes are not included in income or tax computations in France and the United Kingdom.
In the United States, OECD tax statistics include federal, state, and local taxes while study includes only federal taxes.
In France, individual income tax includes only the progressive individual income tax. The flat income tax (CSG and RDS) is included in payroll taxes.
Table A4. Aggregate Income and Tax Rates for International Comparisons
United States United Kingdom FranceIncome Groups
Average 
Income (pre-




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Year 1970
Full Population € 22,103 5.3 20.8 0.3 0.0 26.4 100.0 100.0
(21.0 million families)
P0-90 € 17,020 2.3 24.0 0.0 0.0 26.3 69.30 69.39
P90-95 € 47,073 6.4 17.6 0.2 0.0 24.2 10.65 10.97
P95-99 € 69,144 10.6 14.1 0.4 0.0 25.1 12.51 12.74
P99-99.5 € 114,374 16.8 10.6 0.8 0.0 28.2 2.59 2.52
P99.5-99.9 € 170,477 21.9 7.4 1.9 0.0 31.2 3.09 2.88
P99.9-99.99 € 335,622 30.2 4.2 4.2 0.0 38.6 1.37 1.14
P99.99-100 € 1,095,678 40.1 1.7 6.9 0.0 48.8 0.50 0.35
B. Year 2005
Full Population € 38,665 3.8 33.3 0.5 0.2 37.8 100.0 100.0
(36.8 million families)
P0-90 € 29,612 1.8 34.8 0.1 0.0 36.7 68.93 70.19
P90-95 € 89,486 4.5 33.7 0.6 0.0 38.8 11.57 11.39
P95-99 € 124,156 7.0 31.4 1.4 0.0 39.8 12.84 12.44
P99-99.5 € 182,681 11.6 26.5 2.1 0.1 40.3 2.36 2.27
P99.5-99.9 € 258,371 16.4 21.4 3.0 2.1 43.0 2.67 2.45
P99.9-99.99 € 512,979 22.3 16.5 4.8 4.1 47.8 1.19 1.00
P99.99-100 € 1,645,885 28.8 8.5 7.6 16.6 61.5 0.43 0.26
Notes: Computations are based on income tax return statistics analyzed in Piketty (2001). 
Year 2005 computations are based on incomes from 1998 adjusted for growth and using 2005 tax law.
Families are ranked based on market income excluding realized capital gains.
Average income includes realized capital gains and imputed payroll taxes. Tax rates are estimated
relative to income including realized capital gains and imputed payroll taxes.
Average tax rates (percent) Income shares
Table A5. Income and Tax Rate Statistics for FranceFIGURE A1
Average tax rates, 1960-2004
Figure displays the average tax rate for each of the 4 federal taxes for the full population.
Realized capital gains and corporate tax are added back to income when computing tax rates




































































































Individual Tax Payroll Tax Corporate Tax Estate TaxFIGURE A2

































































































Individual Tax Payroll Tax Corporate Tax Estate TaxFIGURE A3
The Top 1% tax rates, CBO estimates, 1979-2003






























































Individual Tax Payroll Tax Corporate Tax excise